MANDATORY RESPONSIBILITY
      I don’t think it will ever happen, but consider this scenario. Imagine
      Congress passes a law requiring every corporation — in exchange for
      limited liability — to have a triple bottom line. The law also says
      that at least a third of corporate directors should represent workers,
      nature, and communities in which the company operates. And it protects
      directors from lawsuits if they favor nature over profit. You’re
      the CEO of Acme Corporation. What changes do you make after the law takes
      effect?
    Well, you might start by increasing your accounting budget. You’ll
      need, henceforth, to keep track not only of money but also of your nonmonetary
      impacts on society and nature. This isn’t easy, though presumably
      shortcuts will be developed. Next, you assign people to find ways to reduce
      Acme’s negative impacts on nature and society, ranking the proposals
      by years to payback. You budget a modest sum for the most cost-effective
      projects, giving preference to those with public relations value. You publish
      ads and reports, patting yourself on the back for doing what the law requires.
      And you remind your board of directors that, if they choose, they can snub
      offers from the likes of Charles Hurwitz and forgo large capital gains
      for shareholders.
    All this would be well and good. But given the algorithms that still rule,
      how much difference would it make? And even if it did have some effect,
      would it make enough difference in the right ways? After all, you might
      spend your small green budget on one thing, while nature most needs something
      else.
    Now, as an alternative, imagine that the price of nature is no longer
      zero. All of a sudden, it costs big bucks to pollute or degrade ecosystems.
      Overnight, your managers scramble to cut pollution and waste. The higher
      the price, the faster their behavior changes. And it changes in response
      to specific natural scarcities, as indicated by specific prices.
    The question is, which of these approaches would work better — mandatory
      social responsibility, or increases in the price of nature? The answer,
      without doubt, is the latter.
    Free Market Environmentalism
      One other version of privatism is worth considering. Its premise is that
        nature can be preserved, and pollution reduced, by expanding private
        property rights. This line of thought is called free market environmentalism,
        and it’s favored by libertarian think tanks such as the Cato Institute.
    The origins of free market environmentalism go back to an influential
      paper by University of Chicago economist Ronald Coase. Writing in 1960,
      Coase challenged the then-prevailing orthodoxy that government regulation
      is the only way to protect nature. In fact, he argued, nature can be protected
      through property rights, provided they’re clearly defined and the
      cost of enforcing them is low.
    In Coase’s model, pollution is a two-sided problem involving a polluter
      and a pollutee. If one side has clear property rights (for instance, if
      the polluter has a right to emit, or the pollutee has a right not to be
      emitted upon), and transaction costs are low, the two sides will come to
      a deal that reduces pollution.
    How will this happen? Let’s say the pollutee has a right to clean
      air. He could, under common law, sue the polluter for damages. To avoid
      such potential losses, the polluter is willing to pay the pollutee a sum
      of money up front. The pollutee is willing to accept compensation for the
      inconvenience and discomfort caused by the pollution. They agree on a level
      of pollution and a payment that’s satisfactory to both.
    It works the other way, too. If the polluter has the right to pollute,
      the pollutee offers him money to pollute less, and the same deal is reached.
      This pollution level — which is greater than zero but less than the
      polluter would emit if pollution were free — is, in the language
      of economists, optimal. (Whether it’s best for nature is another
      matter.) It’s arrived at because the polluter’s externalities
      have been internalized.
    For fans of privatism, Coase’s theorem was an intellectual breakthrough.
      It gave theoretical credence to the idea that the marketplace, not government,
      is the place to tackle pollution. Instead of burdening business with page
      after page of regulations, all government has to do is assign property
      rights and let markets handle the rest.
    There’s much that’s attractive in free market environmentalism.
      Anything that makes the lives of business managers simpler is, to my mind,
      a good thing — not just for business, but for nature and society
      as a whole. It’s good because things that are simple for managers
      to do will get done, and often quickly, while things that are complicated
      may never get done. Right now, we need to get our economic activity in
      harmony with nature. We need to do that quickly, and at the lowest possible
      cost. If it’s easiest for managers to act when they have prices,
      then let’s give them prices, not regulations and exhortations.
    At the same time, there are critical pieces missing in free market environmentalism.
      First and foremost, it lacks a solid rationale for how property rights
      to nature should be assigned. Coase argued that pollution levels will be
      the same no matter how those rights are apportioned. Although this may
      be true in the world of theory, it makes a big difference to people’s
      pocketbooks whether pollutees pay polluters, or vice versa.
    Most free marketers seem to think pollution rights should be given free
      to polluters. In their view, the citizen’s right to be free of pollution
      is trumped by the polluter’s right to pollute. Taking the opposite
      tack, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense
      Council, argues that polluters have long been trespassing on common property
      and that this trespass is a form of subsidy that ought to end.
    The question for me is, what’s the best way to assign property rights
      when our goal is to protect a birthright shared by everyone? It turns out
      this is a complicated matter, but one we need to explore. There’s
      no textbook way to “propertize” nature. (When I say to propertize,
      I mean to treat an aspect of nature as property, thus making it ownable.
      Privatization goes further and assigns that property to corporate owners.)
      In fact, there are different ways to propertize nature, with dramatically
      different consequences. And since we’ll be living with these new
      property rights — and paying rent to their owners — for a long
      time, it behooves us to get them right. ... read
        the whole chapter