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Natural
Resources
"The
meek shall inherit the earth - but not the mineral rights." -
Jean Paul Getty (1892-1976), billionaire oil tycoon
Henry George: Thy Kingdom Come (1889 speech) ... The story goes on to
describe how the roads of heaven, the
streets of the New Jerusalem, were filled with disconsolate tramp
angels, who had pawned their wings, and were outcasts in Heaven
itself.
You laugh, and it is ridiculous. But there is a moral in it that is worth serious thought. Is it not ridiculous to imagine the application to God’s heaven of the same rules of division that we apply to God’s earth, even while we pray that His will may be done on earth as it is done in Heaven? Really, if we could imagine it, it is impossible to think of heaven treated as we treat this earth, without seeing that, no matter how salubrious were its air, no matter how bright the light that filled it, no matter how magnificent its vegetable growth, there would be poverty, and suffering, and a division of classes in heaven itself, if heaven were parcelled out as we have parceled out the earth. And, conversely, if people were to act towards each other as we must suppose the inhabitants of heaven to do, would not this earth be a very heaven? “Thy kingdom come.” No one can think of the kingdom for which the prayer asks without feeling that it must be a kingdom of justice and equality — not necessarily of equality in condition, but of equality in opportunity. And no one can think of it without seeing that a very kingdom of God might be brought on this earth if people would but seek to do justice — if people would but acknowledge the essential principle of Christianity, that of doing to others as we would have others do to us, and of recognising that we are all here equally the children of the one Father, equally entitled to share His bounty, equally entitled to live our lives and develop our faculties, and to apply our labour to the raw material that He has provided.... Read the whole speech Henry George: In Liverpool: The Financial Reform Meeting at the Liverpool Rotunda (1889)
Henry George: Thou Shalt Not Steal (1887 speech) Not work enough! Why, what is
work? Productive work is simply the application of human labor to land,
it is simply the transforming, into shapes adapted to gratify human
desires, of the raw material that the Creator has placed here. Is there
not opportunity enough for work in this country? Supposing that, when thousands of men are
unemployed and there are hard times everywhere, we could send a
committee up to the high court of heaven to represent the misery and
the poverty of the people here, consequent on their not being able to
find employment.
What answer would we get?
What
could we ask the Creator to furnish us with that is not already here in
abundance? He has given us the globe amply stocked with raw materials
for our needs. He has given us the power of working up this raw
material.
If there seems scarcity, if there is want, if there are people starving in the midst of plenty, is it not simply because what the Creator intended for all has been made the property of the few? And in moving against this giant wrong, which denies to labor access to the natural opportunities for the employment of labor, we move against the cause of poverty. ... Go into Pennsylvania, and there you will see great stretches of land, containing enormous deposits of the finest coal, held by corporations and individuals who are working but little part of it. On these great estates the common American citizens who mine the coal are not allowed even to rent a piece of land, let alone buy it. They can only live in company houses; and they are permitted to stay in them only on condition (and they have to sign a paper to that effect) that they can be evicted at any time on five days’ notice. The companies combine and make coal artificially dear here, and make employment artificially scarce in Pennsylvania. Now, why should not those miners, who work on it half the time, why shouldn’t they dig down in the earth and get up coal for themselves? Who made that coal? There is only one answer — God made that coal. Whom did He make it for? Surely you would say that God made it for the people that would be one day called into being on this earth. But the laws of Pennsylvania, like the laws of New York, say God made it for this corporation and that individual; and thus a few people are permitted to deprive miners of work and make coal artificially dear. A few weeks ago when I was traveling in Illinois a young fellow got into the car at one of the mining towns. Entering into conversation with him, he said he was going to another place to try to get work. He told me of the condition of the miners, that they could scarcely make a living, getting very small wages, and only working about half the time. I said to him: "There is plenty of coal in the ground; why don’t you employ yourselves in digging coal?" He replied: "We did get up a co-operative company, and we went to see the owner of the land to ask what he would take to let us sink a shaft and get out some coal. He wanted $7,500 a year. We could not raise that much." Tax land up to its full value, and how long can such dogs-in-the-manger afford to hold that coal land away from these men? And when people who want work can go and employ themselves, then there will be no million or no thousand unemployed people in all the United States. The relation of employer and employed is a relation of convenience. It is not one imposed by the natural order. People are brought into the world with the power to employ themselves, and they can employ themselves wherever the natural opportunities for employment are not shut up from them. People do not have a natural right to demand employment of another, but they have a natural right, an inalienable right, a right given by their Creator, to demand opportunity to employ themselves. And whenever that right is acknowledged, whenever the people who want to go to work can find natural opportunities to work upon, then there will be as much competition among employers who are anxious to get people to work for them, as there will be among people who are anxious to get work. ... read the whole article Louis Post: Outlines of Louis F. Post's Lectures, with Illustrative Notes and Charts (1894) — Appendix: FAQ
Charles B. Fillebrown: A Catechism of Natural Taxation, from Principles of Natural Taxation (1917)
“Free to Choose: A Conversation with Milton Friedman” — July 2006: http://www.hillsdale.edu/imprimis/ The following is an edited transcript of a conversation between Hillsdale College President Larry Arnn and Milton Friedman, which took place on May 22, 2006, at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in San Francisco, California, during a two-day Hillsdale College National Leadership Seminar celebrating the 25th anniversary of Milton and Rose Friedman's book, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. excerpt:
Q Is there no tax you like? A Yes, there are taxes I like. For example, the gasoline tax, which pays for highways. You have a user tax. The property tax is one of the least bad taxes, because it's levied on something that cannot be produced — that part that is levied on the land. So some taxes are worse than others, but all taxes are bad. — Milton Friedman,
interview with Scott Duke Harris, William Ogilvie: An Essay on the Right of Property in Land (Scotland, 1782) The
monopoly of rude materials, indispensably requisite for carrying
on
any branch of industry, is far more pernicious than the monopoly of
manufactured commodities ready for consumption. The monopoly possessed
by landholders is of the first sort, and affects the prime material of
the most essential industry.
The monopoly possessed by land-holders enables them to deprive the peasants not only of the due reward of industry exercised on the soil, but also of that which they may have opportunity of exercising in any other way, and on any other subject; and hence arises the most obvious interest of the landholder, in promoting manufactures.... Read the entire essay John Dewey: Steps to Economic Recovery
Lindy Davies: Land and Justice
Joseph Stiglitz: October, 2002, interview
Clarence Darrow: How to Abolish Unfair Taxation (1913)
Fred E. Foldvary — The Ultimate Tax Reform: Public Revenue from Land Rent
The economic policy of liberty
has four rules:
Michael Hudson: The Lies of the Land: How and why land gets undervalued Turning
land-value gains into capital gains
Hiding the free lunch Two appraisal methods How land gets a negative value! Where did all the land value go? A curious asymmetry Site values as the economy's "credit sink" Immortally aging buildings Real estate industry's priorities THE FREE LUNCH Its cost to citizens Its cost to the economy Turning land-value
gains into capital gains
YOU MAY THINK the largest
category of assets in this countrly is
industrial plant and machinery. In fact the US Federal Reserve
Board's annual balance sheet shows real estate to be the economy's
largest asset, two-thirds of
America's wealth and more than 60
percent of that in land, depending on the assessment method.
Most
capital gains are land-value gains. The big players do not
want their profits in rent, which is taxed as ordinary income, but in
capital gains, taxed at a lower rate. To benefit as much as
possible
from today's real estate bubble of fast rising land values they
pledge a property's rent income to pay interest on the debt for as
much property as they can buy with as little of their own money as
possible. After paying off the mortgage lender they sell the property
and get to keep the "capital gain".
This price appreciation is actually a "land gain", that is, it's not from providing start-up capital for new enterprises, but from sitting on a rising asset already in place, the land. Its value rises because neighbourhoods are upgraded, mortgage money is ample, and rezoning is favorable from farmland on the outskirts of cities to gentrification of the core to create high-income residential developments. The potential capital gain can be huge. That's why developers are willing to pay their mortgage lenders so much of their rent income, often all of it. Of course, investing most surplus income and wealth in land has been going on ever since antiquity, and also pledging one's land for debt ("mortgaging the homestead") that often led to its forfeiture to creditors or to forced sale under distress conditions. Today borrowing against land is a path to getting rich -- before the land bubble bursts. As economies have grown richer, most of their surplus is still being spent acquiring real property, both for prestige and because its flow of rental income grows as society's prosperity grows. That's why lenders find real estate to be the collateral of choice. Most new
entries into the Forbes or Fortune
lists of
the richest men consist of real estate billionaires, or individuals
coming from the fuels and minerals industries or natural monopolies.
Those who have not inherited family fortunes have gained their
wealth
by borrowing money to buy assets that have soared in value. Land may
not be a factor of production, but it enables its owners to assert
claims of ownership and obligation, i.e., rentier income in the forms
of rent and interest. ... Read the whole
article The Social Justice of Site Value
Rating
The Efficiency of Site Value Rating How Valuations would be Made Both for reasons of social justice and for reasons of economic efficiency, site value rating deserves a continued place in the programme of the Liberal Party. The case for site value rating in terms of social justice is founded on two understandings: first, that the value of land in the absence of economic development is the common heritage of humanity, and second, that increases in the rental value of land arising from economic development and government expenditures should be collected by governments to finance those activities. What is meant by "land" is the unimproved value of sites and the value of extractable natural resources such as North Sea oil. While there may someday be institutions capable of implementing a recognition of land as the heritage of all humanity on a worldwide basis, in the absence of such institutions each nation should implement a recognition that land within its boundaries is the common heritage of its citizens. This is accomplished not by making the nation a gigantic Common or by instituting government management of all land, but rather by requiring all persons and corporations that are granted the use of land to pay a fee or tax equal to what the rental value of the land they control would be if it were in an unimproved condition. The case for site value rating in terms of economic efficiency is founded on the fact that a tax on resources that are not produced by human effort is one of the few sources of government revenue that does not reduce incentives for people to be productive. Two other revenue sources that have this virtue are taxes on other government-granted privileges such as exclusive use of radio frequencies and taxes on activities with harmful consequences, such as polluting the air. An economy will be more efficient if revenue sources that do not diminish productivity are employed to the greatest possible extent before any use is made of taxes that impede productivity. What makes a tax efficient is that the amount of tax that is due cannot be reduced by reducing productive activities. When incomes are taxed, people can reduce the amount of taxes owed by working less. They do so, and the productivity of the economy falls. When houses are taxed, people can reduce the amount of taxes owed by building fewer house and smaller houses. They do so, and the housing shortage worsens. But when the unimproved value of land is taxed, there is no resulting diminution in the quantity of land. Thus taxes can be levied on land without diminishing the productivity of an economy. And shifting taxes from other, destructive bases to land will improve the productivity of an economy. Subsequent sections explain in more detail these social justice and efficiency arguments for site value rating, describe procedures for implementing such a tax system, and explain why a variety of potential objections are without merit. ... The extraction of minerals
requires special treatment under site
value rating, because this activity reduces the value of the heritage
of future generations. For mineral deposits that can be expected to
be fully depleted within a few years, the sensible thing to do is to
auction the right to deplete the resource fully, subject to rules
about restoration of the site when extraction is complete. Future
generations should be compensated by investing the proceeds in such a
way that all generations share equally in the value of the extracted
resource.
For deposits that can be expected to last a generation or more, one must be concerned about whether future generations will be content with the financial arrangements that are made. For these cases, it is best to have deposits developed by joint public-private enterprises, where costs are shared in the same proportions as benefits, so that future generations cannot complain about their heritage having been sold for a song. In the same way that mineral
extractions reduce the value of land
for future generations, so can the subdivision of land into small
parcels. Once land has been subdivided, it is extremely expensive, if
it is possible at all, to reassemble it for projects that require
large sites. Reassembly, and the economic growth that it permits, can
be facilitated by a "self-assessed property tax." Under such a tax,
each owner of property is required to specify a price at which he or
she would be willing to sell the property, and anyone who wishes can
buy the property at that price. A person who was required to sell
would be permitted to remove anything he or she wished, so that
compulsory sales would be initiated only by persons or public bodies
that wished to redevelop land. The appropriate tax rate would be a
fraction of a per cent per year, so that people would find it
financially feasible to assess their land a prices that would fully
compensate them for being required to relinquish it. ... Read
the whole article Nic Tideman: Global Economic Justice, followed by Creating Global Economic Justice Humanity is emerging from eons of development during which survival has been promoted both by the ability to grab resources from others and by the ability of groups to cooperate and share natural resources within communities that occupied territorial homelands. In recent centuries we have been developing a consensus that taking from the weak is wrong, and that we ought to have a social order that prevents all such behavior. But we have not yet worked out how to do it. Some people think of preventing grabbing in terms of preserving the status quo. There are two difficulties with this.
A practice of allowing an appropriation to be treated as just if it has survived long enough gives aggressors an incentive to see if they can grab and hold on long enough. The result is actions like Indonesia's seizure of East Timor and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Only if we have a standard of justice that is independent of history can we expect to end such actions. Henry George's theory of economic justice--that every person has a right to his or her productive powers, and that all persons have equal rights to all natural opportunities--provides a simple formula around which opinion about the shape of a peaceful world can coalesce. This may seem hopelessly optimistic. But no other theory that I have seen has anything like the clarity, coherence and power of this theory. ... Resources that Fluctuate over Time The natural opportunities that have been considered to this point are ones that, to a first approximation, yield constant returns over time. A new set of issues arises when this theory of social justice is applied to resources that yield returns that necessarily vary over time. Now the issue of intergenerational justice arises along with that of international justice. Consider first the issue of intergenerational justice without the complication of international concerns. The efficient use of depletable natural opportunities requires that they be allocated over time in such a way as to maximize the present value of net revenue from sales. As economists have long known, this requires that prices charged for resources that are being depleted rise at the rate of interest. But this is just efficiency. It says nothing about who should get the money. The axiom that all persons have equal rights to natural opportunities suggests that when we deplete a resource such as oil, there are two steps that must be taken to achieve intergenerational equity. In the first step, when oil is sold we must share the proceeds over generations in such a way that every person in every generation can receive a payment of the same real value every year. To satisfy this obligation when the number of people alive in different years is not proportional to the amount of oil used in those years, we need to invest the proceeds of oil sales in a fund that would make annual payments to all persons of a size that could be maintained for all generations. This first step provides intergenerational equity with respect to oil revenue, but it does nothing about the fact that, if oil is allocated efficiently over time, later generations will face a higher price of oil than early generations. To provide equity with respect to the changing price of access to natural opportunities, there must be a second step that redistributes money among generations to offset the changing price. This second step implicitly assumes a world with no change in technology. If an early generation provides later generations with improved technology, then the later generations are treated justly if the combination of prices of commodities, technology and money received from the earlier generation permits them to attain the same overall level of satisfaction as the earlier generation. This specification of justice presumes that everyone has the same tastes. When tastes differ, an improvement in technology that more than compensates some persons for a greater scarcity of some natural resources will provide inadequate compensation for others. Such inequality cannot be avoided. All that can be expected is that those who use exhaustible resources will, by limiting their use and providing endowments for future generations, make it possible for the typical member of every future generation to attain the same level of well-being as the typical members of the earlier generations of resource users. Success in such an effort cannot be guaranteed. We don't know the tastes of future generations. We don't know the rate at which technology will advance. We don't know the rate at which new resources will be discovered. Estimates of all these things must be made to determine the proper rate of resource use and the proper endowments of future generations. The most that can be asked for is a good-faith effort to achieve the standard required by justice. Now consider the international dimension of intergenerational equity. What one nation owes to others with respect to intergenerational equity is compensation for making it more difficult for the other nations to provide adequately for their future generations. If all nations are using the same amount of oil per capita, then no nation can complain about what the others are doing. But if one nation is using more oil per capita than the others, then it owes compensation to the others for making it harder for the others to provide all of their future generations with equal rights to natural opportunities. If oil is being allocated efficiently and equitably among generations, the amount of compensation that an excessively consuming nation owes will be the market value of its excess oil consumption, valued in terms of the price of oil in the ground. The same result is obtained if all nations include the resource value of all oil that they consume, and all other depletable resources, in the calculation of what they appropriate for themselves from everyone's common heritage. One of the ways that a nation can compensate other nations for disproportionate use of natural opportunities is by creating technology that other nations can use to compensate their future generations for scarcer natural resources. If gasoline costs twice as much but cars are twice as efficient, people are not, on net, disadvantaged by the higher price of gasoline. This line of reasoning requires contestable judgements about the value of new technology and how long it would have taken before someone else would have made the same discovery. Nevertheless, technological improvements are a valid form of compensation for resource scarcity. One issue that arises when technological improvements are used as compensation is that not all nations place the same value on technology. If some island nation wishes to maintain a way of life that does not involve cars, then that nation is not compensated for an increased scarcity of fish by increased efficiency of car engines. What compensates a particular nation must reflect the typical preferences of that nation. Another troublesome issue with
respect to natural opportunities is
that people have different ideas about which creatures are properly
treated simply as resources and which deserve a higher level of
respect. When creatures are non-migratory, the right to control them
can simply go with the land they occupy, and bids for the land will
reflect values with respect to the creatures that occupy the land.
However, with migratory creatures such as whales and songbirds, a
different mechanism must be created to deal with desires to protect.
If nations representing 80% of the world's population want to protect
whales, then they should be able to protect 80% of whales. How such a
rule would be implemented in practice is a problem that I leave for
others to wrestle with. ...
What to Do When Some Nations Fail to Fulfill Their Obligations THE THEORY that has been developed incorporates all of the ways that nations impinge upon one another by their appropriations of natural opportunities-through their claims to land, natural resources, the frequency spectrum, and geosynchronous orbits, through their appropriations of fish in the ocean, through their use of natural resources that are embedded in goods, through their emissions of pollutants that cross international borders, including the ones that produce global warming and ozone depletion, through their decisions to have population growth rates that differ from the world average, and in any other way that nations appropriate scarce natural opportunities. The theory describes what nations must do to fulfill their obligations to other nations. But how will unwilling nations be compelled to fulfill their obligations if they do not wish to do so? The theory is not designed to coerce recalcitrant nations. The theory is designed to describe what must be done by those who wish to fulfill their obligations. But universal acceptance is not needed for the theory to work. In the first place, under the theory that has been presented only some nations have obligations. The others have claims. Until a careful analysis is done, it is not possible to specify which nations have the obligations and which have the claims. But only the nations with obligations need to be persuaded to fulfill their obligations under the theory, and these are likely to be predominantly rich nations. Because the magnitudes of transfers to recipient nations depend on what those nations do, they receive incentives to economize on their appropriations of natural opportunities, even if they do not agree with the theory. But suppose that only some of the nations with net obligations are willing to honor those obligations. How should these nations respond to the lack of cooperation by others?
What if a nation refuses to share the value of natural opportunities among its citizens? A reasonable test of whether a nation can properly be treated as the agent of its citizens and the appropriate recipient of its citizens' shares of the value of natural opportunities is whether the nation allows its citizens to leave. If a nation does not allow its citizens to leave, then it is not proper to treat the nation as the agent of its citizens. The citizens are effectively imprisoned. We have no way of honoring our obligations to them. We might put their shares in trust, but if they are not allowed to leave, then we should not trust their government to use their shares of the value of natural opportunities as they would wish. On the other hand, if the citizens could leave and decline to do so, and if there are some other nations that would accept them, then we are justified in regarding their continued citizenship as evidence of their implied consent to the decisions of their government about how their shares of natural opportunities will be used. This rule may induce governments that would otherwise keep their citizens captive within their borders to instead allow them liberty. Thus the proper application of a principle of equal rights of all persons to natural opportunities will generate incentives for increased compliance and increased liberty for all. It is not necessary to have a world government that has the power to coerce all nations to abide by a single authority's determination of what they owe. Every nation can make its own determination of what, if anything, they owe to others. Within broad limits people can accept differing interpretations of obligations. If some nation exceeds the limits of tolerance, other nations can reasonably respond by declining to regard that nation or its citizens as the true owners of the things they seek to trade. What is created is a diverse, tolerant, and responsible international community. It is not necessary to achieve
universal acceptance of this theory
for it to be effective. What is necessary is acceptance by the major
economic powers, plus a willingness to condition economic relations
on an assurance that traded goods are not unjustly appropriated from
nature, and are not made with the labor of persons who are deprived
of their liberty to migrate if they choose.... Read
the whole article How would the world look if its
political institutions were
shaped by the conception of social justice advanced by Henry
George?
Nic Tideman: Applications of Land Value Taxation to Problems of Environmental Protection, Congestion, Efficient Resource Use, Population, and Economic Growth Applications
to Resource Use
It is only a small step from
charging people for street use and
parks to charging them for renewable and exhaustible resources. If
people who could fish as much as they wanted would deplete fish
stocks excessively, then some form of control over fishing is
beneficial. It is possible in theory to have efficient control
through quotas, though it is difficult to set the quotas properly,
and highly contentious to change them when conditions require a
change. The recognition that the fish are everyone's common
heritage would require that, if there are to be quotas, the quotas be
auctioned, and that if not, then everyone who fishes be required to
pay for fishing according to the loss in the value of fish stocks
that results from fishing. If a fishing resource lies entirely
within a single nation (as in a lake or river), then the recipient of
the fees for fishing should be the polity that includes the resources
(Though the value of the fishing resource would be included in the
calculation of whether the nation was using more than its share of
global natural opportunities.) When the fishing resource is in
international waters, the fees should be shared equally among all
nations in proportion to their populations. ...
With resources such as oil, which
are depleted over time, new
issues of efficiency and justice arise. Depletable resources ought to
be regarded as part of the heritage to which everyone has equal
rights, though some provision must then be made to provide incentives
for discovery. Equal rights are
expressed by requiring everyone who
uses a depletable resource to pay for the resulting depletion.
Efficiency requires
that a resource that is to be depleted over time
be sold in such a pattern over time as will maximize the present
value of receipts. This generally means using a lot in early years,
then less and less as time goes by, with the price of resources in
the ground rising at the interest rate. If the receipts were spent as
they were received, more would go to early generations than to later
generations. A principle of equal rights to natural opportunities
means that the receipts should be put into a fund, from which equal
payments are made to all persons in all years. Furthermore, later
generations are disadvantaged by the higher price of oil that they
face. A principle of equal rights for all persons would allocate
additional payments to later generations to compensate them for the
higher price of oil they faced, though this could be offset by later
generations having access to technology that earlier generations did
not have. Thus a nation that provides the rest of the world with
technology that eases the task of providing for future generations
should receive a credit for this, although there will be difficulty
in estimating the contribution of any innovation. (If one person had
not discovered something, the chances are that eventually some else
would have.) ... Read the entire article The
Complementary Right of Equal Access to Natural Opportunities
One of the factors that makes the case for secession difficult is the problem of regional inequality in natural resources. When the people who called themselves Biafrans sought to secede from Nigeria in the 1960s, the morality of their claim was undermined by the fact that, if they had succeeded, they would have taken disproportionate oil resources from the rest of Nigerians. The limited support for the efforts of the Chechins to separate from Russia is explained in part by the understanding that, even though the Chechins have been abused by Russians for centuries and have never fully acceded to their incorporation into Russia, if Chechniya were allowed to separate from Russia, that would create a precedent that would make it difficult to oppose an effort by the people of the sparsely populated Yakutsia region of Eastern Siberia, rich in oil and diamonds, to insist that they too have a right to be a separate nation. Perhaps, a general recognition of a right of secession will need to wait for another component of moral evolution: a recognition that all persons have equal claims on the value of natural opportunities. If this were recognized, then any nation or region with disproportionately great natural resources would be seen to have an obligation to share the value from using those resources with those parts of the world that have less than average resources per capita. This would eliminate the desire to appropriate natural resources as a reason for secession and as a reason for opposing secession. Signs of a recognition of the equal claims of all persons on the use of natural opportunities are slim. One can point to John Locke: Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us, the Men, being once born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence: Or Revelation, which gives us an account of those Grants God made of the World to Adam, and to Noah, and his Sons, 'tis very clear, that God, as King David says, Psal. CXV. xvi. has given the Earth to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in common.2 Locke goes on to say that every person has a right to himself, and therefore to the things of value that are created by combining his efforts with natural opportunities, "at least where there is as much and as good left in common for others." He then argues that with so much unclaimed land in America, no one can justly complain if all of Europe is privately appropriated. Locke does not address the question of how rights to land should be handled if there is no unclaimed land. Thomas Jefferson, writing on the subject of patents, said, But while it is a moot question whether the origin of any kind of property is derived from nature at all, it would be singular to admit a natural and even an hereditary right to inventors. It is agreed by those who have seriously considered the subject, that no individual has, of natural right, a separate property in an acre of land, for instance.3 Henry George said, The equal right of all men to the use of land is as clear as their equal right to breathe the air--it is a right proclaimed by the fact of their existence. For we cannot suppose that some men have the right to be in this world and others no right. General recognition of the equal rights of all to the use of land and other natural opportunities is hard to find. When the powerful nations of the world got together to eject Iraq from Kuwait, very little was heard of the bizarreness of supposing that Emir of Kuwait and his relatives had a right to all the oil that lay under Kuwait. Some recognition of equal rights to the use of natural opportunities can be found in the proposed Law of the Sea Treaty, which would have had all nations benefiting from the granting of franchises to extract minerals from the sea. From an economic perspective, the treaty was flawed by the fact that it would have created an artificial scarcity of seabed mining activities in order to raise revenue, and it was opposed by the U.S. and not implemented. But it did suggest general recognition of global equal rights to at least those natural opportunities that no one has yet begun to use. One impediment to the recognition
of equal rights to the use of
natural opportunities is that some system of assessment would be
needed to identify the transfers that would compensate for unequal
access to natural opportunities. Another impediment is that a system
of rewards for those who discover new opportunities would be needed.
But if there were a will to address them, these technical
difficulties could be solved adequately, as they are in jurisdictions
such as Alberta, Canada, that claim all mineral rights for the
government.... Read the whole article NATURE'S "GIFTS" SHOULDN'T BE "FREE"!
We all need to be responsible (and financially accountable) for the consequences of our purchasing decisions. If the goods and services we buy have been produced by drawing on more of the Global Commons than others, then we'll be paying more eco-taxes. Some obvious examples of the activities whose costs we, the consumers, would have to bear are:
Karl Williams: Land Value Taxation: The Overlooked But Vital Eco-Tax I. Historical overview
II. The problem of sprawl III. Affordable and efficient public transport IV. Agricultural benefits V. Financial concerns VI. Conclusion: A greater perspective Appendix: "Natural Capitalism" -- A Case Study in Blindness to Land Value Taxation Synopsis Land value taxation (LVT) has often been omitted from the lists of natural resources for which eco-taxes are being advocated. LVT provides strong financial encouragement for land to be put to its optimal use and will eliminate speculation on land, as occupants must pay the full LVT whether the land is being fully utilised or not. This leads to better land management, a reduction in urban sprawl, less urban smothering of agricultural land, and less farmland being pushed into hinterland. LVT makes the investment in resource-efficient infrastructure affordable because the resulting enhanced land values are "recycled" back into public coffers. One particular application of LVT to agricultural land provides much-needed financial incentives for organic farming. Unlike other ecotaxes which "sow the seeds of their own revenue demise," LVT actuallyincreases over time as our environment is enhanced and is thus a stable revenue base. This paper argues that the LVT assessment process shifts and refines our focus from monitoring human activity onto our use and abuse of natural resources, as any responsible form of stewardship should. It suggests that only if land users are prepared to pay the full cost of utilising resources should private resource holding be permitted. "The depletion of natural
resources and
the despoliation of nature is due to a single reason: the failure
properly to measure the rental value of all of nature's resources, and
to make the users pay the community for the benefits they receive." F.
Harrison, "The Corruption of Economics" ...
Why has land value taxation
(LVT) frequently been omitted from lists of
significant eco-taxes yet, as this paper will argue, LVT can be
enormously influential in its effect on economic and environmental
practices?
One reason lies in the confusion arising from how the very word "land" is used imprecisely or in different circumstances such as
Even within the discipline of
macroeconomics, there have been three major shifts in the way land has
been regarded, almost in the manner of a magician's sleight of
hand. Scene 1 has the magician display a rabbit in a cage. Scene
2 has the rabbit disappear. Scene 3 has the magician pull the "same"
rabbit out of a hat.
The process of monitoring and
assessing LVT itself leads to a more
subtle, more environmentally-appreciative understanding of how best to
prioritise conflicting demands on land. Should a tract of land best be
used for green space for local residents, a light rail corridor or
employment providing development? LVT assessment inherently weighs the
pros and cons of a whole range of intangible costs and benefits for the
wider community now and into the future, and eliminates corrupting
"NIMBY" motives and rent-seeking behaviour that influence existing
planning and development decisions. In response to the accusation that
LVT assessment is little more than a best guess at quantifying values
that are inherently unquantifiable, LVT advocates respond "Guilty as
charged!" However, they then add, "Our good guesses are based on solid,
objective methodology and are better than wild guesses, and even most
wild guesses are better than the decisions made today." Currently,
many natural resources are almost assigned a worthless value because,
not entering the mainstream marketplace, they usually have no $ tags
hanging off them - hence the existence of externalities whereby the
environment is plundered as near worthless. So
even wild guesses at the value of land and other natural resources are
better than the present situation, in which the "no guess" decision
effectively assigns natural and community resources a zero value.
One way or another, it is necessary to quantify and prioritise the real value (in a broad sense) of natural resources to better account for economic externalities. In the end, only if a prospective resource user is prepared to pay the full cost of utilising land and other natural resources will resource extraction or development go ahead. The intrinsic nature of the LVT assessment process considerably assists in such cost estimation. LVT's foundation of detailed land use assessments will also help expose the true costs of subsidies for natural resources, which effectively amount to negative eco-taxes. Subsidies come in all shapes and sizes, often barely visible, and urgently need to be exposed and evaluated. Even some harmful subsidies which are labeled land taxes have nothing to do with genuine LVT. Banks gives the example of a Brazilian tax which was levied on unimproved land but was reduced by up to 90% on land used for crops or pasture. Forests were classified as unimproved land and were therefore taxed at the full rate, which induced settlers to chop down the trees to reduce their tax liability." ... The whole field of eco-taxes cannot be viewed in isolation of the fiscal imperatives to raise sufficient public finance, and here we see another of the virtues of LVT. If people were required to pay the rental value of most natural resources they used (as many, in fact, already do - to private owners) an adjustment in patterns of consumption would follow. The environmental goals would be achieved - at the cost of fiscal goals.... read the entire article The Special Challenge to
Economic Thinking
The Search for Surrogates Sources of Nonpoint Pollution What Problems are Created? What Problems are Unsolved by Excise Taxes on Surrogates? The Case of Forestry The Case of Urban Settlement The Case of Agriculture The Common Theme from Forest, City and Farm Solutions Mason Gaffney: Property Tax: Biases and Reforms Priority
#1. Safeguarding the property tax
Priority #2: Enforce Good Laws
Priority
#3. De-Balkanize Tax Enclaves
Priority
#4. What Tax to Fight First?
Priority #5: Make Landowners Pay Their Taxes In 1946 President Harry S. Truman, with the stroke of a pen, added 50 percent to the area of the U.S. when he unilaterally extended our traditional three-mile limit out to 200 miles.
Most of our domestic oil and gas
is now produced from the seabed
under this water wilderness. The property is public domain under
federal BLM administration, but firms bid for leaseholds there under
a system that the majors seem to manipulate to their advantage. Even
so, there are some Federal revenues from both lease payments and
corporate taxes. State and local revenues, however; are nil.
Counties may, and often do assess and tax "possessory interests" in leaseholds on federal uplands that lie within state boundaries. They are helpless, however, to tax such property held offshore. The property values are huge, and so are the firms that own the leaseholds. Many firms own tens of millions of acres apiece, areas larger than whole states. Offshore oil is our largest enclave protecting rent-bearing lands from property taxation, and any other form of state or local taxation. Some form of national property tax is called for; or higher lease payments in lieu of taxes. Perhaps some income tax surcharge is the best way, or special federal tax on net proceeds. This paper cannot enter the thicket of what jurisdiction should have sovereignty to tax offshore leaseholds, nor how best to levy the tax. The point here is that no system of resource-based taxation is complete, philosophically or practically, that leaves this enclave untouched. Read the whole article
I. The issue
II. Sources of rent III. Dissipation of rent before the fisc takes it: what and how? A. Dissipation means waste and
destruction or suppression.
B. How rent is dissipated. C. Open access followed by tenure: rent-seeking institutions. IV. Dissipating rent via
public spending
A. Taxes and lease provisions
need not twist incentives.
B. Public spending of tax proceeds may dissipate rent. C. History of recognition of this spending effect D. Successful compromises with the principle. 1. Barriers to immigration or
sharing.
E. Less successful compromises with the principle2. Selling voters on the benefits of immigration 1. Public works.
2. Subsidized public works in tandem with exclusionary zoning 3. Hocking the revenues V. Solutions
A. Socialize rent at the
national level.
B. Limit benefits to citizens per se (not to landowners per se). C. A social dividend to citizens is the obvious route. D. Return rents to local school districts in inverse proportion to local tax base per capita (the Colin Clark principle). E. Promote James Madison and Neville Chamberlain to elder statesmen emeritus. Read the whole article Mason Gaffney: Sounding the Revenue Potential of Land: Fifteen Lost Elements Variant
kinds of
natural resources, hitherto neglected or not classed with land, show
great revenue potential.
Some examples are
Mason Gaffney: The Taxable Surplus of Land: Measuring, Guarding and Gathering It 1. Common Property in Land is
Compatible with the Market
Economy.
2. The Net Product of Land is the Taxable Surplus A. To socialize the taxable
surplus, land rent,
effectively, you must define
and identify it carefully, and structure your taxes to
home in on it.
B. Taxable surplus is also what you can tax without driving land into the wrong use. C. To tax rent we must be sure there is rent to tax, and we must adopt public policies to husband and maximize it, and avoid policies that lower and dissipate it. i. Avoid "perverse subsidies."
ii. Avoid letting lessees of public land conceal their revenues. iii. Avoid letting lessees or taxpayers pad their costs to understate their net revenues. iv. Avoid dissipating rent by allowing open access to resources like fisheries, v. Avoid trying to distribute rents to consumers by capping prices below the market. D. Raising output by removing
tax bias
E. Maximizing public revenue. F. Sustaining the tax base 3. Taxing the Net Product of
Land Permits Untaxing Labor
4. Taxing the Net Product of Land Permits Untaxing Capital 5. Taxing the Net Product of Land Provides Ample Public Revenues: a Master Solution to Many Problems A. Public revenues will support
the ruble.
B. Your public credit will, of course, recover to AAA rating when lenders see that there is a strong flow of revenue to pay public debts. C. Never again need you bend to any "advice" or commands from alien lenders, nor endure patronizing, humiliating homilies from alien bankers, nor beg any foreign power for aid. D. If you again feel the need (as I hope you will not) to rebuild your military, you will of course require strong revenues. E. Strong national revenues are required to unite Russia, and keep it one nation. Summary
1. Common Property in Land is
Compatible with the Market
Economy.
You can enjoy the benefits of a market economy without
sacrificing your common rights to the land of Russia. There is no need
to make a
hard choice between the two. One of the great fallacies that western
economists
and bankers are foisting on you is that you have to give up one to
enjoy the other.
These counselors work through lending and granting agencies that seduce
you with
loans and grants to learn and accept their ideology, which they
variously call
Neo-Classical Economics, or "monetarism," or "liberalization." It is
glitter to distract you and pave the way for aliens to acquire and
control your
resources.
To keep land common while shifting to a market economy, you simply use the tax system. Taxation is the form that common property takes in a monetary, market-oriented economy. To tax is to socialize. It's then just a simple question of what you will socialize through taxation, and how; but in the answers lie success or failure. Not only can you have both common land and free markets, you can't have one without the other. They go together, like love and marriage. You need market prices to help identify land's taxable surplus, which is the net product of land after deducting the human costs of using it. At the same time, you must support government from land revenues to have a truly free market, because otherwise you will raise taxes from production, trade, and capital formation, interfering with free markets. If you learn this second point, and act on it, you will have a much freer market than any of the OECD nations that now presume to instruct you, and that are campaigning vigorously to make all nations in the world "harmonize" their taxes to conform with their own abysmal systems.
The very people who gave us the term laissez-faire -- the
slogan at the core of a
free market economy -- made communizing land rents a
central part of their
program. These were the French economistes of the 18th
Century, sometimes
called "Physiocrats," who were the tutors of Adam Smith,
and who inspired land
reforms throughout Europe. The best-known of them were
François Quesnay and
A.R. Jacques Turgot, who championed land taxation. They
accurately called it the
"co-proprietorship of land by the state."
Since their time we have learned to measure land values, and we have broadened the meaning of "land" to comprise all natural resources. Agrarians will be relieved, and may be surprised, that farmland ranks well down the list in terms of total market value. Thus, a land tax is not primarily a tax on farms; only the very best soils in the best locations yield much taxable surplus. ... Another natural resource (hence part of "land"), whose nature and value the mass of people are only slowly realizing, is the radio spectrum. In this age of communication its value is vaulting skywards even faster than the rockets launching the satellites that direct and relay signals through the spectrum. Each satellite requires a spectrum assignment, or it is nothing but space junk. One minor American entrepreneur, Craig McCaw, collected a bundle of spectrum rights for cell phones, and a few years ago sold them to AT&T for $12 billions. Then Mr. McCaw went partners with Bill Gates, perhaps the richest American, in a firm called Teledesic, to launch hundreds of satellites and amass radio spectrum rights around the entire world, including your part of the world, in the hope of dominating worldwide communications. Radio spectrum is a natural resource, and it belongs to the government, even in the capitalistic U.S.A. When Teledesic comes calling, under the auspices of our Vice President Al Gore, don't sell anything cheap! In fact, don't sell anything at all, but lease it for a limited time, so you may gain from future rises in value. And don't stint on the professional help you should hire to protect your interests: these lease contracts are complex, and are worth Billions if you play your cards right. Hydrocarbons are a third set of valuable resources. The values involved are gigantic. The recent merger of the Exxon and Mobil oil firms was valued at $260 billions, several times greater than the Russian annual budget. Why should private parties make off with all this natural value? Several nations, including some of your neighbors, support themselves entirely from these revenues. Norway pays for a lush welfare state from its oil revenues. Its reserves are so valuable that the mere change in their appraised value in several recent years has exceeded the entire GDP of Norway. And your oil reserves? If they match your production, they may be the largest in the world. World oil prices are down this year, as you know, but there is another side to this. The devaluation of the ruble has raised the value of your oil in Russian terms, because the oil earns "hard" currency abroad. Your government has recognized this by imposing a special tax on the resulting "windfall," but we will see below (Sections 2,C and 2,D) that there is a much more effective way to tax resource rents. The American state of Alaska holds down its other taxes by socializing part of its oil revenues, which otherwise would inure to a handful of the major stockholders of two corporations (ARCO and BP). Alaska not only holds down other taxes, it pays each resident - man, woman, and child - a social dividend of over $1,000 per year. Go thou and do likewise. Your expert, Dmitri Lvov from the Russian Academy of Sciences, a speaker at this meeting, has written that you could cover most of your national budget from your enormous production of oil and gas. Many third-world nations like Venezuela or Nigeria have fabulous mineral oil that they fail to exploit for their own people, letting sophisticated or ruthless foreign corporations, in tandem with weak or corrupt insiders, reap the gains. The question for Russia is whether to follow their bad example and become a poor resource-colony of the west, or whether to assert your own sovereignty over your own resources for the benefit of your own people. You need look no further than Norway for a model. Other subsoil resources have great value, too. Many nations, even backward ones, gain large parts of their national revenue from "hardrock" minerals. Bolivia, Gabon, Jamaica, Liberia, New Caledonia, Papua-New Guinea, Zaire, and Zambia have raised over 25% of their budgets this way in recent years; Chile, Thailand and Malaysia have taken lesser, but substantial amounts. Saskatchewan, a Canadian Province, raises large revenues from potash and uranium; Minnesota, an American state, from iron ore; and so on. Some other nations fail to raise much revenue from fabulous minerals from which others profit, like S. Africa with its gold and diamonds, West Virginia with its coal, or Missouri with its lead mines and reserves. Russia is a treasure-house of untapped mineral wealth that you can and should tax to alleviate the condition of the Russian people. In arid lands, water is life, and the most valuable natural resource is water. For example, in southern California we need water so much we import it from the Feather River 600 miles north of us, pump it uphill through the long San Joaquin Valley, then over the high Tehachapi Mountain range, and tunnel it through the San Bernardino Mountain Range, all at great cost. When it gets here, it supplements and competes with local water that nature provides freely in the Santa Ana, San Jacinto, and other rivers. That local water then has a value equal to the high cost of importing the remote northern water. That value in the local waters is a taxable surplus. However, we have not learned to take that surplus value into the local treasuries; we give the water away, and worse, we actually subsidize people to withdraw water by helping them pay for dams, canals, and pipelines so they can waste water without paying for it. Thus we turn a public asset into a public liability - an extreme form of folly that is called "dissipating rent." In this age of growing water scarcities it is past time we learned to husband and nurture rent, in order to socialize it by taxing the surplus. So should you, in comparable circumstances. Another value from water is to generate power. Again, California witlessly fails to socialize this value, but Canada, our northern neighbor, has shown the way. British Columbia, Newfoundland (the Labrador part), Quebec, and other provinces raise large revenues from charges on the use of falling water. Russia, with some of the world's largest hydro-electric projects, can do the same, or better. Fisheries are another source of value. In the past most nations have let this rent be "dissipated" by overfishing. In recent years the U.S. and Canada have in effect "privatized" fishing in their offshore waters by limiting the number of licenses and boats. This limitation was needed and desirable, overall. It created large rents, where previously there were little or none, by preventing overfishing and the great waste of duplicate, triplicate, and even quintuplicate fishing effort. That is a good example of husbanding and guarding rent, which is necessary before you can collect it. It was not necessary or desirable, however, to give away this net benefit to private parties. The government did not sell these licenses, but simply gave them away to owners of existing boats, and others with political influence. Each license now sells for something like a million dollars, creating a new class of instant millionaires and "parlor fishermen." This giveaway to the few, and takeaway from the many, created an instant class society where before there were equal access and equal opportunities. These privileges are worth so much that there are now documented cases off Alaska where the parlor fisherman takes 70% of the total catch. The captain, the crew, and the owner of the boat, who do the work and bear the dangers and discomforts and financial risks of fishing, must get by with the other 30%. Parlor fishermen are simply leeches; these rents should be socialized, relieving the workers from taxes. ... Avoid "perverse subsidies." These are subsidies that encourage harmful things like
We have mentioned how we actually subsidize people to withdraw scarce water from our overdrawn rivers in the arid U.S.A. The so-called water "shortage" in the lower Colorado River is entirely an artifact of such misguided policies: every major agency drawing on the Colorado is actually subsidized to do so, when they should be paying for the privilege. If they paid, they would stop wasting water, and would enrich the Treasury, which could then abate taxes on work, trade, and saving. The U.S. Forest Service has turned a great national asset, our national forestlands, into a drain on the Treasury by subsidizing forest roads in subeconomic areas. It makes money selling good timber in good areas, but then spends $10 on roads into subeconomic areas to get $1 in revenues from sale of timber to private parties, destroying scenic values and watershed protection. Perverse subsidies like those are unspeakably foolish and wasteful. They "dissipate rent" so there is none left to tax. Avoid letting lessees of public land conceal their revenues. Many minerals and hydrocarbons on public lands are leased by private firms, subject either to "royalties" or "severance taxes" based on the value of output. Many of these private firms are "vertically integrated," meaning they own the downstream firms, often in other countries, to which they sell. They grow skilled at shifting profits away from where taxes are higher to where they are lower, by rigging the internal transfer prices. That is, they sell to themselves at artificially low prices, so your share of their revenues disappears. What they call "world market" prices are really their own internal prices, adjusted to help them steal from you. You must guard against that. Avoid trying to distribute rents to consumers by capping prices below the market. This, of course, is the history of energy prices in Russia; it has also been used, in milder forms, in Canada and the U.S. What is wrong with it? In a word, it fosters wasteful use, and aborts a lot of economical production. In addition, it leaves a lot of rent in private hands, untaxed. It is easy to understand the dire need for guaranteed fuel in a northern continental winter climate. You mustn't let people freeze, and they will bless and support you for keeping them warm. As society gets better organized, though, you can gain by guaranteeing the poor a minimum cash income with which to buy fuel and other needs at market prices, rather than lavishing them with free fuel that you might be exporting to meet other urgent needs. You can provide the cash income from the rents created when fuel prices rise, and have a lot more to spare from the resulting net gains, which I next explain. ... Note, finally, that a cap on the price of G [gross revenues], such as discussed above, has the same effects as a tax based on G. Read the entire article Nic Tideman: The Ethics of Coercion in Public Finance Jeff Smith: How Sharing Earth Brought Peace Since forever, humans have
claimed and counter-claimed every
square inch of this planet. Occasionally, these disputes have ended
peacefully. What has worked in other times and places might work
again in the Mideast. Delivering a double dividend, what settled land
disputes also developed moribund economies and revived developed
ones. Among others, New York, now aiming to rebuild, has used this
policy before. Because it's growing popular among environmentalists,
greens could lead the US to geonomics.
... These cases involved different classes, not different cultures. Yet with a new twist the rent rebate that worked within society may work between societies. The Koran urges landlords to not gouge tenants but to consider land a trust. In Israel, admonished to not own land forever, since the land is Mine (Leviticus), the National Trust leases all the land to the occupants. These strictures could lead to geonomics. Israel and Palestine would establish a steward to collect land dues and disburse rent dividends a la Alaska's oil dividend. Since land is more valuable in Israel than in Palestine, Jews would pay in more than Arabs, yet everyone would get back the same. And since Israelis prosper, they drive up land values; having Jews as co-owners developing land, raising its value, fattening everyone's Citizens Dividend Arabs might accept that. Profit does make for strange bedfellows. Two archrivals, China and Taiwan, recently agreed to explore for oil together. While sharing rent may soothe hurt
feelings, collecting it
stimulates development. ...
Using geonomics, people have turned some of the poorest lands into the richest economies. Hong Kong is a barren rock owned by the public. The city collects enough site-rent to keep taxes on effort way down. ... Where to draw a line in the sand becomes a lot less contentious when land and oil are no longer spoils of war and when neighbors do not endure drastically different standards of living. Growing up, we learn to not fight over toys but to take turns. Societies need to learn this, too. Early last century, Gifford
Pinchot, first head of the US Forest
Service, said: "The earth belongs of right to all its people and not
to a minority, insignificant in numbers but tremendous in wealth and
power. The people shall get their fair share of the benefit which
comes from the development of the country which belongs to us all
with equal opportunity for all and special privileges for none." A
man in a Republican administration could say that then. We need to
hear it again now. Read the whole article
Money is the mother's milk of
politics. Yet the milk invested by
lobbyists and those they represent is a drop in the bucket compared
to the flow they get back from the public tit, thanks to the milkmaid
state. Politicians grant well-connected big businesses:
a. direct cash outlays, such as cash to corporations for advertising overseas, Land titles are the granddaddy of all privileges. Historically, titles preceded all others and created a class of elite owners with the power to win the six other indirect subsidies, along with the more direct ones – grants, contracts, and tax favors. To undo and reverse this history, it's necessary to collect and share the natural rents from all seven inconspicuous privileges. For these pieces of paper, government should charge full market value. ... Getting a Citizens Dividend would not only eliminate poverty, it'd also erase any rationale for subsidies - direct or indirect - to the poor or to the privileged. Repealing the free ride of privileges would be like repealing capitalism. Without those subtle detours imposed upon public revenue, owners would have to work to amass a fortune, and work is one of the worst ways known to strike it rich. What you can do: Dry up the
milkmaid state. Dispense with the
notion that the state must meddle in enterprise. Dispense the notion
from others, too. Focus government on its lone raison d'etre - defend
rights. Demand your right to a fair share of natural revenue. ...
Read the whole article Alanna
Hartzok: CITIZEN DIVIDENDS
AND OIL RESOURCE RENTS Abstract: Citizens of
Alaska have been receiving
individual dividend checks from an oil rent trust fund since 1982.
Norway¹s citizens receive substantial social services and invest
oil rents in a permanent fund for the future. Nigeria has yet to
establish a similar fund for its oil revenue stream. This paper
explores the oil rent institutions of Alaska, Norway and Nigeria with
a focus on these questions: |