Wealth and Want
... because democracy alone is not enough to produce widely shared prosperity.
Home Essential Documents Themes All Documents Authors Glossary Links Contact Us
Mason Gaffney
for more, see progress.org and http://www.masongaffney.org/

Nonpoint Pollution: Tractable Solutions to Intractable Problems

Full Employment, Growth And Progress On A Small Planet: Relieving Poverty While Healing The Earth
Land as a Distinctive Factor of Production
What happens when a state radically slashes its property tax?
Two-Rate in Reverse
Privatizing Land Without Giveaway
Neo-classical Economics as a Stratagem Against Henry George
How to Revive a Dying City
Bottling the Air
The Partiality of Indexing Capital Gains
(1990)
Cannan's Law
California's Governor-Elect
Land Rent in a Tax-free Society
Canada's System of Revenue Sharing
Economics in Support of Environmentalism
Eighteen Fallacies 
For Want of a Landlord
Henry George 100 Years Later: The Great Reconciler  
George's Economics of Abundance: Replacing dismal choices with practical resolutions and synergies
Taxation of interjurisdictional e-commerce
Interview: Is There a Conspiracy in the Teaching of Economics and History within the American Education System?
Megabucks for Negabucks: Solving the Water Crisis
Oil and Gas Leasing: a Study in Pseudo-Socialism
Property Tax: Biases and Reforms
The Relationship Between Property Taxation and the Concentration of Farm Land Ownership

Rent Seeking and Global Conflict
Rent, Taxation, Dissipation and Federalism
Rising Inequality and Falling Property Tax Rates
Sounding the Revenue Potential of Land: Fifteen Lost Elements
The Red and the Blue
The Taxable Capacity of Land
The Taxable Surplus of Land: Measuring, Guarding and Gathering It 
Unearned increments and reality in California's recall election
Who Owns Southern California?
In Memoriam, Stan Sapiro






Mason Gaffney: Nonpoint Pollution: Tractable Solutions to Intractable Problems
The Special Challenge to Economic Thinking
The Search for Surrogates
Sources of Nonpoint Pollution
What Problems are Created?
What Problems are Unsolved by Excise Taxes on Surrogates?
The Case of Forestry
The Case of Urban Settlement
The Case of Agriculture
The Common Theme from Forest, City and Farm
Solutions

Nonpoint pollution goes right to a chink in the armor of conventionally trained economists (like myself) who are overtrained towards becoming protagonists of the price system.  To the skeptical we are "free market freaks": eco-freaks who are -nomic rather than -logical.  Whatever our faults we are zealous, and carry the conviction of true belief.  With the problem at hand, however, we can't do what we do best, that is call for price signals, punt, and slip away.   

The very name "nonpoint" pollution suggests that economists see this as just an odd bit of clutter, something "non-regular" in their tidy world.  Indeed, all pollution was an exception, an "externality," until recently (at least at my age it seems so).  Then they learned you can meter effluents and tax them, or trade effluent rights around like private property.  Thenceforth they could fit pollution right into existing models and ideologies with minimum intellectual strain.  They were happy as Procrustes with a new guest.   

But we can't meter runoff — how frustrating. 
  • It comes from areas —how disorienting. 
  • Its damages are spread unequally over other areas, differentially populated — how non-homogenous. 
Standard-brand economists are ill-equipped and undisposed to face such problems.  Read the entire article


Full Employment, Growth And Progress On A Small Planet: Relieving Poverty While Healing The Earth
There is enough land, if only we use it well. Poverty and unemployment result from owners’ withholding better lands from full or any use, creating an artificial and specious scarcity of land relative to population. Read the whole article

Land as a Distinctive Factor of Production

A.  Primary Distinctions
A-1.  Land is not produced nor reproducible
A-2.  Land as site is permanent and recyclable
A-3.  Land supply is fixed
a. The overall planet is fixed.  |  b. Land is fixed within political jurisdictions.  | c. Land as site is immobile in space, permanently. | d. Land is fixed in form. | e. Acquiring land must mean taking others'.
A-4.  Land is immobile in space and uncontrollable in time
a.  Land does not migrate. | b.  Land values are marked by continuity in space | c. The services of land flow and perish with time.  | d.  Land is not uniform to a user or firm. | e.  Land is not uniform to a city or economy | f.      Land division is a highly social process. | g. Nuclei are interdependent. | h. Land is immobile among taxing jurisdictions.
A-5.  Land does not turn over, but rather is recycled and is versatile
a. Land is not convertible into other land. | b. Land is necessarily versatile. | c. Land per se is economically divisible, unlike capital.  | d. Capital evinces "economies of simultaneity" in construction.
A-6.  Land is not interchangeable with capital
A-7  Land rents are subject to common forces that differed from and are generally reverse to those that determine interest rates (the price of capital.
A-8.  Land price guides investors and determines the character of capital, as capital substitutes for land
A-9.  Land is limitational
A-10.  Land value is not an economic fund
B. Major Economic Consequences
B-1.  The origin of property in land is not economic
a. Politics guides the original distribution.
i)      The right to sell was won by force, is not universally honored, and must be kept by continuous use of force.
ii)     In practice, selling for cash up front reserves most land for a few with front-money advantage, inside information, good contacts, corrupt aides, etc.
iii)    The ability to bid high does not necessarily come from legitimate saving.
b.  Privatization is dominated by giveaways and resultant "rent-seeking,” which warps allocation.
c  Inertia takes over after the original distribution, perpetuating and aggravating it.

d. WTA vs. WTP survey findings; their relevance and import.
B-2.  Much land remains untenured
B-3.  Landownership imparts superior bargaining power
B-4.  Land Rent does not evoke production, thrift or investment
a. Land rent does not determine interest rates. | b.      Existence of land value actually lowers saving rates. | i)      Land value substitutes for real capital in portfolios and thus lowers the need to create real capital.   | ii)     Rising land prices are net income to individuals. | c. Investing in land is macro-economically sterile.  | d. Public policy needs to promote capital formation but not land creation. | e. Land price is unrelated to cost of producing land.
B-5.  Land rent is a taxable surplus
a. Relative elasticities. | b.  The surplus is much more than usually stated.  
B-6.  Uniformity in taxation between land and capital is not neutral
a.  Land and capital are non-interchangeable, and mutually exclusive. | b. Taxing capital is non-neutral per se. | c. It is impossible to tax capital uniformly. | d. It is impossible and undesirable to tax consumption uniformly.
B-7.  Land values are hypersensitive to discount rates
B-8.  Land markets are dominated by access to long-term credit
a. Financing purchase ranges from difficult to impossible. | b. Land purchase is not self-liquidating.  | c.The corollary of high land price is high carrying cost relative to cash flow. | d. Credit barriers are barriers to equimarginal allocation of land.
B-9.  Control of land gravitates to financially "strong hands"
a. Landownership accretes around existing nuclei. | b. It follows that landownership is highly concentrated.
B-10.  Land markets are sticky
a. Weak seller motivation.  | b. Waiting for Godot.  | c. Limited competition.  | d. Lags in reallocation. | e. Lack of homogeneous land. | f Lack of turnover. | g. Hoarding for vertical integration. | h. Assembly.  | i. Institutional stickiness.
B-11.  Land is a major basis of market power
a. Expansion is zero-sum. | b. Land is a natural base for monopoly and monopsony.  | c. The differentiation of land is permanent. | d. Local market power. | e. Land is the basis of cartels. | f Land puts the lock on monopoly.
B-12.  Land income is much greater than the current cash flow
a. Appreciation is current income. | b. Landowning yields large non-cash service flows.  | c. Land income is a prior claim, not a "residual." Cf.  A- 14. | d.Land income is a large share of national income.
B-13.  Consuming land means preempting its time
B-14.  Land's rent is its opportunity cost, regardless of use
B-15.  Land value is hypersensitive to the environment (Canary in the mine)
B-16.  LAND USES THAT STINT ON LABOR SPELL UNEMPLOYMENT
B-17.  THE LAND-SURFEIT OF SOME, WHEN UNCONSTRAINED, SPELLS HOMELESSNESS FOR OTHERS

C. Land-driven Booms and Busts
C-1.  LAND VALUATION IS SUBJECTIVE
C-2.  Land value is used as the basis of credit and money
C-3.  Land markets are prime causes of instability
a.      Land prices move in cycles of high amplitude. | b.      Investors respond to high land-price by forming land-saving capital, i.e. substituting capital for land.  It is useful to distinguish five forms this substitution takes (cf A-6, where these points are outlined).
i)      Land-saving capital, like high buildings.
ii)     Land-enhancing capital, meaning capital used to improve land for a new, higher use.
iii)    Land-linking capital, like canals and rails and city streets.
iv)      Land-capturing (rent-seeking) capital, like squatters' improvements, and canal and rail lines built to secure land grants, and dams and canals built to secure water rights.  
v)      Rent-leading capital.
c.      Land-saving capital is well above average in durability.
SUMMARY   Read the whole article

... Hundreds of books on economic theory are published with "land" absent from the index. ...

The discipline has not totally eliminated land, but marginalized it. The discipline has not totally terminated land: it is too subtle for outright skullduggery, preferring equivocation and confusion.  Rather, it has marginalized it.  There is a subdiscipline called "Land Economics," and a journal of that name.  There are journals of Agricultural Economics, Urban Economics, Regional Science, Environmental Economics, Natural Resources, and more.  There are also whole disciplines of Geography, Economic Geography, Military Science, Biogeography, Geology, Geometry, Surveying, Astronomy, Theology, Ecology, Oceanography, Meteorology, Soils, Physiography, Topography, and Hydrology, all dealing with The Earth and Nature and Creation as definable topics distinct from man's works. ...

Common micro theory finesses Time.  It deals with economic relations as though they occurred at a point in time (and space as well); as though they were relations of coexistence, rather than a cavalcade of events in sequence.   Sometimes two points are allowed (short run and long).  Thus micro theory can ignore the birth of capital, its growth, maturity, senescence, death, burial, and replacement, vital elements of its difference from land.  Time, and relations of sequence, are hived off to the far satellite of "finance," usually not even taught in departments of economics.  Time is also referred to under "history of economic thought," as an obsession of some 19th century Austrians who wrote quaintly of "roundabout" (time-using) methods of production. Relations of sequence are found in macro, but not firmly integrated with microtheory, which is the enduring core of the discipline.  Microtheory still deals with relations of coexistence in time, and space as well. As A. A. Milne once wrote, "It isn't really anywhere, it's somewhere else instead." Of neoclassical theory we may add, "It isn't really anytime, it's some other time instead."6 ...


"Land" in economics means all natural resources and agents, with their sites (locations and extensions in space).  Land is not just the matter occupying space: it is space. It includes many things not colloquially called land, such as
  • water and the beds under it,
  • the radio spectrum,
  • docks,
  • rights of way,
  • take-off/landing time slots for aircraft,
  • aquifers,
  • ambient air (the right to breathe it and the license to pollute),
  • "air rights" to strata in the third dimension of cities,
  • falling water,
  • wild fish, game, and vegetation,
  • natural scenery,
  • weather,
  • the environment,
  • the ecology,
  • the natural gene pool, etc. 
  • Any franchise, license or privilege giving territorial rights is a species of easement over land. 
    • Your driver's license is a right to use land;
    • red lights remind us of the critical value of space at central locations, since two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. 
    • It is worth a lot to have the right-of-way, as railroads do.
Economic land excludes many things, too, that are colloquially called land.  It excludes land-fill, for example, by which many cities are extended into shallow waters.  The site and seabed are properly land; the land-fill is an improvement.  There is no "made land" in the economic sense: it is reallocated from other uses.  Expanding cities take farmland from producing food and fiber, much of it for the expanding city itself.  Filled land in shallow water near cities is taken away from anglers and sailors and viewers and ecologists, who now routinely  organize to prevent it being "made" away with.  Drained and filled wetlands are taken away from endangered species, as well as from their primal role as filters protecting coastal waters from river trash and pollutants.  Thanks to the myopia and dereliction of economists, it has taken militant environmentalists to carry home this truth, developing in their struggle to be heard and understood a deep skepticism of economists and their "way of thinking." Some economists and environmentalists are now coming to terms with each other, after decades of mutual shunning.  Too many modern economists, however, still use their "way of thinking" to seal out important new evidence that doesn't fit the model. ...

Capital occupies space; land is space.  In common micro theory, resources and markets come together at a point not just in time but in space.  Again, it excludes from its purview one of the prime qualities of land.6
6.      It is ironic that economists purport or affect to ape the methods of physics, when they delete both space and time from their subject.  If they have borrowed from physics, they have taken the form without the substance.

For the reasons given, alone, land and capital are mutually exclusive. There are, however, nine more, which follow.  ... Read the whole article

Land as "site" (location plus extension) does not normally wear out, depreciate, spoil, obsolesce, nor get used up by human activities incident to occupancy and production. In contrast, capital depreciates from time and use, routinely and by nature.  After being formed, it must be conserved from entropy by continual maintenance, repair, remodeling, safeguarding against theft and fire, and so on.7  Like our own bodies, it returns to dust; land is the dust to which it returns.  Inventories are depleted; moving parts wear out; fixed capital depreciates with use and time. ...

It follows that the demand for land arises over time with incomes, but faster than incomes. ...
Land value in cities may be defined as "what is left after a good fire"; arsonists take that quite literally.  ... Read the whole article





What happens when a state radically slashes its property tax?

Michiganders are saying they must wait and see, but there is no need for that: California can show you 17 years of experience. To read your future, just study our past. Here is what has happened since California passed Proposition 13 in 1978.

The obvious direct results have been to cut public services, raise other taxes, and lose credit rating. ...

The private sector is doing badly, too. Raising income taxes, business taxes, and sales taxes is no way to stimulate an economy; they are all a drag on work and enterprise. ...

It should give one pause. It is, however, if you think about it, the expectable result of what the voters did.
  • They turned property from a functional concept into a sacred one; from a commission to be enterprising, hire people, produce goods, and pay taxes into a welfare entitlement.
  • They rejected the concept of a tax on inert wealth in favor of the rival concept of taxing liquidity and cash flow.
The predictable result is to inhibit economic activity, and encourage holding wealth inert and stagnant.

David Shulman tersely summarized the distributive effects of Prop. 13 as he left us for Salomon Brothers in Manhattan: "it breached the social compact." ...

1/8 of all new businesses started in the U.S. were in L.A., 1945-50. These were small, creative, flexible, and too varied to classify. No Linnaeus could sort them in conventional categories: the new Angelenos simply stayed here and started producing everything for themselves, some things previously imported, and others never seen before.  ...

Why is that not happening today, 1995? An invisible, pervasive change is Proposition 13, which makes it possible to hold land at negligible tax cost. In 1945 land was taxed at 3% every year, building a fire under holdouts to turn their land to use. Today that same tax cost is well below 1%. Using Gwartney's Rule of Thumb, it is about 1/8 of 1%: a rate of 1% applied to 1/8 of the true value.

Landowners are only taxed now if they use their land to hire people and produce something useful. Then they meet the drag of our high business and employment and sales taxes, necessitated by the fall of property taxes. A handful of oligopolistic landowners control most of the market; small businesses are squeezed out. This helps us segue from being at the cutting edge of industrial progress to a third-world economy - from the NH model to the AL model - with little relief in sight. ...

California displayed amazing growth up to 1978, and the resilience to shrug off the loss of war industries after 1945 and still grow "explosively" (as Jane Jacobs put it). After 1978 we have a string of reverses. The timing, along with a priori causative analysis, plus various direct observations too numerous for this time-slot, support an hypothesis that the reverses were aggravated by Prop. 13. Michigan, be warned of our lot, and learn about taxes from us: "This Could Happen to You." Read the whole article

Two-Rate in Reverse
In 1955, Spiro Agnew was a Maryland State Assemblyman on the rise. He carried a new law that let tax assessors value farmland on its "use-value" as farmland, instead of market value. It let owners who were farming for unearned increments around Baltimore and D.C. hold out with low carrying costs. "Farmland" meant land used for farming, and any play at farming would qualify. Under this law, a relative of mine with 102 acres in Maryland near Western Avenue, the D.C. line, kept just two steers thereon to validate his farmland assessment status. Holding for the rise "never crossed his mind." Right -- except, whenever such land is condemned for public use, courts everywhere have held that compensation must be based on speculative market value. ...

It is not just peri-urban land speculators who gain. A large chunk of land value in rural regions is not based on cash flow from food and fiber, but on amenities. Wisconsin is a major playground for rich urbanites from nearby Chicago, Milwaukee, Minneapolis and St. Paul. "Use-value" assessment exempts this chunk of value completely, for use-value is based on capitalizing the net cash farm income from growing crops, and, in the Wisconsin law, specifically corn. The highest land values per capita in the State are in Vilas County up in the north woods, once dismissed as worthless "cutovers." Vilas' barren podzol soils are worthless for corn, but sparkling lakes bedizen the County. Values per capita in Vilas are 6 times those in Milwaukee. Rich recreationists and "investors" (read speculators) are gobbling up the "wild forties." Shoreline parcels are like diamonds among coal. ...

100 years ago, American Georgists made a big point that city land outvalues rural land many times over. One implication is that taxing city land is taxing the rich, and we can ignore farmland. Some land-taxers counsel that farmers are easily misled to oppose us, so leave them alone and convert the cities. But rich city folks also own choice rural lands.

  • The Hearst palace at San Simeon sits amid 82,000 manorial acres, including miles of prime shoreline, "improved" with just one home per 82,000 acres. This home, jammed with imported treasures, had become a white elephant even before Citizen Kane uttered his final "Rosebud." The heirs were glad to fob it off onto the taxpayers of California, deducting its alleged value from their taxable incomes, while they kept the 82,000 acres.
  • Craig McCaw, who made his billions by amassing spectrum licenses, turned some of the pile into a spread of many thousands of acres stretching north from Big Sur -- land he never got around to using.
  • The O'Neill families and Donald Bren of Orange County,
  • the Newhall family of Ventura County,
  • the Chandler family that owns the Tejon and Boswell empires that spread over several counties,
  • Ted Turner who owns over a million acres around the U.S.;
  • the Koch brothers of Kansas with all their oil wells,
  • the Kleberg tribe with their million-acre King Ranch in Texas;
  • the Southern Pacific Railroad (now Catellus Co.),
  • Standard Oil:
those are a few of the struggling family farmers whom use-value assessment of farmland saves from destitution.

The privilege of use-value assessment stretches even beyond farmlands, vast as they are. Timberland in most states gets the same preferred treatment, only better. About 1/3 of the privately owned land in the U.S. is in timber. In California, owners (mostly huge corporations) may put the land into the "TPZ" class. The standing timber is then exempt, and taxed only at harvest, at 2.9%, much too low a rate to make up for a 60-year lifetime of exemption. County assessors have to value the land separately on its putative value for growing timber, following a State-legislated formula that is tailored drastically to understate even that low value (California Revenue and Tax Code, Section 434.5). Much of that land, though, has alternative uses, e.g. for retirement and vacation homes and resorts, the outliers and pioneers of urban sprawl. There are also mineral values, hunting, fishing, rifle ranges, grazing, campsites, tourism, rights of way, lumber camps, loading sites, water sources, lakes, log storage, landings - there are many things to do with 1/3 of a nation's land. Those uses are all declared "compatible" with timber, hence land values derived therefrom are tax-exempt.  Read the whole article


Privatizing Land Without Giveaway





Neo-classical Economics as a Stratagem Against Henry George (in The Corruption of Economics, London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1994)

The Imperative to Put Down Henry George
The crabbed spirit of neo-classical economics
Popular responsiveness to problem-solvers
Henry George as reconciler and problem-solver
  • George reconciled common land rights with private tenure, free markets, and modern capitalism.
    a. Those who got the upper hand by securing land tenures would support public services, so wages and commerce and capital formation could go untaxed.  
    b. To pay the taxes, landowners would have to use the land by hiring workers (or selling to owner-operators and owner-residents). This would raise demand for labor; labor spending would raise demand for final products.
    c. To pay the workers, landowners would have to produce and sell goods, raising supply and precluding inflation. Needed capital would come to their aid by virtue of its being untaxed.
  • George's proposal lets us lower taxes on labor without raising taxes on capital.
  • Georgist tax policy reconciles equity and efficiency.
  • A state, provincial, or local government can finance generous public services without driving away business or population.
  • Georgist tax policy contains urban sprawl, and its heavy associated costs, without overriding market decisions or consumer preferences, simply by making the market work better.
  • Georgist tax policy makes jobs without inflation, and without deficits.
  • George's land tax lets a polity attract people and capital en masse, without diluting its resource base.
  • Georgist policies let us conserve ecology and environment while also making jobs, by abating sprawl.
  • Georgist policies let us strengthen public revenues while in the same process promoting economy in government.  Read the whole article
How to Revive a Dying City

Blight is not restricted to stagnant or declining cities. In booming Los Angeles, there is Watts. In nearby Riverside, one of the fastest growing cities in the nation, the CBD [Central Business District] is surrounded by blight which, among other things, frustrates years of subsidies aimed at reviving the moribund CBD itself.

These extreme cases are not anomalies, not simply ghettoes and embarrassments; they are symptoms of systemic malfunction. They could be portents and symbols for the rest of the economy. Blight may be defined as failure to maintain, replace, and renew capital inherited from the past. Studies indicate that all of American industry faces this problem, compared with vigorous foreign competitors. In learning to cure blight, we may learn to restore the greatness and pride of this whole troubled nation.

There is also good news: some cities have risen from the grave. Indeed, all land development is resurrection in a sense: all land has been used before for something. The history of a city lot usually shows that there were several antecedent improvements, layered like the ruins of ancient Troy. The goal should be to make renewal happen faster and more widely, while we are still here to benefit. ...

Some cities should be abandoned.

Towns around played-out mines are obvious examples. A farm town becomes redundant when new roads let customers patronize a larger or better town. Salvage what you can and move on.

Some would apply the same logic to all cities. Dead cities aren't lost, they say, but rebuilt elsewhere; they were cash cows that have been milked dry. Their depreciation allowances are reinvested on new frontiers; people and vitality move with the capital. It is an important half-truth, but a half-truth is also half wrong. The basic original site stays put; land cannot move. Public and private social capital cannot move, either.

We cannot afford throwaway cities in a finite world. New natural sites are not common. There is only one Hudson Valley with only one mouth, and here New York City has stood for 350 years. We cannot abandon the Bronx and duplicate its environment somewhere; we cannot rebuild the natural setting, and the sunk social capital is too costly. Relocating to suburbs involves commuting cost in terms of money and congestion. And then, when we tire of the new suburbs, where will we go next?

Furthermore, blighted areas have high potential market values. Picture a topographic map of a city where the contour lines represent points not of equal elevation, but of equal market value per square foot. The peaks, the Everests and McKinleys, are in the city retail centers, where just one square foot rises to $2,000 (about $90 million per acre). Land just a few miles away from dizzying altitudes can hardly be worthless. Harlem is near Park Avenue; Watts is near Beverly Hills; South State Street is very near the Sears Tower. Newark is 15 minutes by train from Manhattan. Newark office rents are $25/sf per year. That is less, of course, than in Manhattan, but in Riverside, California, we are throwing up offices to get rent of $12/sf per year, while Newark stagnates.

This was written in 1988.  That $90 million per acre figure is much higher now.

George saw cities as foci of civilization's basic mechanisms. People with mutual access, associating on equal terms, expedite cooperation and specialization through the market. Multivariate interactions are synergistic. Indeed, while each parcel is developed in the stage of decreasing returns, the composite city is generally in a stage of increasing returns, thanks to synergy: the whole exceeds the sum of its parts, and increases to the whole yield more than the sum of increases to the parts. Synergistic surplus, said George, lodges in urban land rents. Thus he explained a phenomenon which other economists overlooked: the unparalleled rise in urban rents and land prices, and in owners' wealth and power. ...

To understand ground rents and land prices is to understand cities; not to understand is to remain mired forever in confusion and fallacy. Ground rent continues forever, generally tending to rise; therefore, to buy title to land, people pay prices that look high relative to current cash flows. ....

Urban land prices take your breath away.

Land prices vary extremely from city to city or block to block. The cost to build a square foot of floor space is fairly constant from place to place, but demand varies with location. A small rise in floor rental translates into a large rise in ground rent and land price, because the land owner gets everything above what is required to operate and amortize the building. Thus,

  • in Riverside, neighborhood mall space rental of $12 just pays for the building, with only a little left over, resulting in land prices of perhaps $5-$8/sf.
  • In Manhattan, rentals are triple those in Riverside; all surplus accrues to ground rent, resulting in land prices 300 times higher than in Riverside.
At key locations in bigger cities, land prices are not just high per square foot, they are higher per capita than in small cities. They are even higher relative to building values, in spite of the high-rise buildings. Remember that each additional floor adds more ground rent, because floor space rental is more than enough to cover the added cost.

Land prices across cities and neighborhoods are much more differentiated than other measures economists commonly cite. For example, the median income in upper east side Manhattan is about 8 times higher than north of Central Park, while the price of land per square foot is probably 40 times higher. Urban land is also highly concentrated in ownership; a handful of people and corporations own most of it. A growing share of income property is held by wealthy aliens, who want to diversify and acquire secure wealth they can manage by remote control. Aliens even hold a good deal of residential property in international "jet set" communities.

Because urban rents are a social surplus, not a payment for anyone's making or supplying land, parties other than the landowner have a claim. A good deal of American politics deals with how to assert that claim and share in the surplus.

Dividing a big pie seems a pleasant enough task, but Confucius knew better: "It is easier to face a common enemy than to share a surplus." The common ways of sharing surplus are clumsy, divisive, and destructive; they bear some responsibility for dead cities. With too much quarreling over spoils, there are no spoils to dispute. Consider how spoils are shared, and how we might do better.
  • Rent control
  • "French Equity" (Equity in Kind):  Today we approach French Equity indirectly, and expensively. We distribute land haphazardly, but seek to make every parcel equally good by extending utilities and roads to all parcels on the same terms, regardless of cost or location.

Economists call such schemes "postage stamp pricing," because postal rates do not vary with delivery costs. Manhattan has 64,000 residents per square mile; Montana has 5.4. It costs a lot more to collect or deliver mail in Montana. The reason postal rates rise is that the U.S. urban population is spreading out more like Montana and less like Manhattan (which once had over 100,000 per square mile). Here are five other examples:

  • The British Columbia Ferry Service. ...
  • British Columbia Hydro....
  • Water and sewer service in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. ...
  • State university campuses. ...
  • Water supply in California. ...
The key to renewing cities is shifting from obstructive ways of sharing rent, like rent control; and destructive ways, like looting and subsidies; to constructive ways. Henry George showed us how equity and efficiency go hand in hand, how the magic of justice combines with the magic of incentive.
  • First, by George, equity need not be in kind. The monetary mechanism overcomes the clumsiness of in-kind equity. If four families inherit a one-family house, all four don't crowd in; they sell and divide the money, or one buys out the others. There is equity in money as well as in real estate. Money is often better; the reinvestment opportunity puts the house on a magic carpet to follow you anywhere. Money is wonderful!
  • Second, by George, use the tax mechanism. Do not divide land into unusable morsels, or shackle the market with rent controls, or dissipate rent in subsidies. Give land to the highest bidder, and tax ground rents to support government.
"Higher Taxes that Promote Development." The fixed tax is levied on land value, based on opportunity cost. The owner uses land harder and improves it more to meet a fixed tax; or sells, releasing surplus land to those needing more space. Taxes stifle enterprise only if they increase with enterprise. Land tax increases only with opportunity cost, which is independent of the enterprise of the owner. The only activity this tax impairs is withholding land from use.

George's land tax promotes equity toward the landless in at least four ways:

  • it relieves them of taxes, to the extent that landowners pay more;
  • it supplies them with more goods and services, as land is used better;
  • it offers them jobs producing those goods and services; and
  • it offers them a better chance to acquire land, as surpluses are released to the market.
This is supply-side economics with a kick.  ... George's program not only reconciles efficiency and equity, it squares taxes and incentives. What more can we ask of economic policy than to resolve stand-offs that have confused us, and dead-locked constructive action, for generations? ...

Camden has the highest tax rate in New Jersey, causing a vicious circle as high rates drive away capital and further erode the tax base. What if only land value were taxed? The depressant would become a stimulant by the simple magic of converting a variable charge into a fixed, unavoidable one. So it is with most depressed cities, which today look vainly to Washington for salvation. They need enabling legislation from their states, on the Pennsylvania model, but given this power can save themselves.

The counterpart of sharing rent through taxation is to untax things, like buildings, that involve human endeavor. This doubles the incentive effect. If land tax is the stick, untaxing buildings is the corresponding carrot, and George's program makes both larger. Every lot with an old "Defender" building has a potential replacement, the "Challenger." Taxing buildings rigs the fight against the Challenger. Say the lot-cum-Defender is worth $100K, and the Challenger would cost $500K to build. Challenger cash flow must exceed Defender cash flow by enough to pay $500K, plus added taxes based on it.

Georgist tax, by contrast, is impartial between Defender and Challenger; the market decides.

New buildings face liquidity crises; almost all are built on credit and need time to yield cash. The timing of tax on a building maximizes the damage during the crisis period, for any given tax yield over time. Of course, every building uses public services, but new buildings in older cities pay for more than they receive, while old ones receive more than they pay for. Think of building tax as a forced loan to the Treasury, to be recovered when the building is older. What could be more counterproductive than forcing a loan from a builder passing through a credit crisis? The Georgist tax is low when the builder's cash needs are pressing, and rises slowly over time as the site ripens to its next best use.

Urban blight is cumulative and self-reinforcing: blighted buildings cast a pall on land around them, discourage upkeep, and stifle renewal. Whatever slows renewal of one site slows the neighborhood in a vicious, downward spiral. Conversely, new buildings stimulate renewal. There are exceptions; some new buildings sterilize blocks with blank walls.

But the exception is not the rule, and abuse is not the precept. The rule is that new buildings draw tenants from old and weaken other Defenders, so that other owners also renew. When they do, where better than next to the newest building? Renewal, like blight, is cumulative, but in a benign, upward spiral. Competition for sites raises the tax base if land values are derived from ground rents. The higher base allows the city to improve public services without taxing buildings or scaring away generators of fiscal surpluses. In this scenario, buildings raise the tax base indirectly, by raising the value of land around them.

Riverside built a downtown pedestrian mall when they were in vogue, and has been sorry ever since. It did not work; retailers deserted, and half the stores are empty. I asked the developer of a successful mall why he thought downtown failed, and got a two word answer: "absentee ownership." I should have known, having preached it for years.

Farm advisers say, "The best dressing for soil is the owner's shadow, applied daily." In town they ask, "Who's keeping the store?" Absentees aren't the only negligent owners, nor are they all bad. Torpid owners are the problem, and they come in many forms. A city wants to be rid of owners who see real estate as a cash cow for their retirement, and to replace them with owners who see it as a vehicle for enterprise and who apply their shadows daily. The shadows follow them to local civic clubs and to enterprising downtown or neighborhood associations for making joint improvements.

The surplus to land attracts outside buyers. Absentees, redundant parties in production, are often top bidders for pure ownership, which is the legal right to receive land rent plus unearned increments that accrue over time. Georgist taxation cuts directly into rents and unearned increments, which attract absentee owners; it spares the rewards of enterprise. It thereby effects a market transfer of ownership from absentees to occupants, with the community benefits that follow. In a period of rising concern over alien takeovers of U.S. real estate, these points merit focused attention.

Untaxing buildings attracts outside capital to an area, but does not result in new capital formation for the economy. In Keynesian models, however, reducing tax on new capital raises the rate of return after taxes (marginal efficiency of capital) and creates new capital. In supply-side models, increasing saving is more important. Land taxation helps here, too.

Land taxation, if vigorously applied, tends to reduce the investment value of land, through a process called "tax capitalization." With land devalued, those needing wealth acquire substitute assets by saving more, and investing the savings in real new capital rather than land.

Georgist taxation tends to reduce the need for public spending in two obvious ways.
  • One is to increase job opportunity, which in turn reduces welfare spending. More productive job opportunities should reduce pressure for military spending of a boondoggling, make-jobs nature as well.
  • The other is to eliminate urban sprawl and its wasteful cross-subsidies.
"Slum clearance" in the 1950s had a negative caste, with a name catered solely for middle class consumption. Reuse of cleared land was often at lower density, inevitably throwing unhoused people on the private market. Federal "urban re-newal" in the 1960s, while better named, emphasized clearing, not rebuilding. The inventory of cleared, unrebuilt land under the program grew each year. Cynics' cracks of "bombing out" and "Negro re-moval" were on the mark, though blacks were not the only evictees. Any talk of demolition and renewal evokes the specters of those cruel, wasteful programs.

But George's program begins with fostering renewal and intensive use. Clearance is involved only to serve renewal, never as a goal in itself. The first land taken would generally be vacant or with boarded-up buildings. New buildings would draw renters and buyers from old ones, releasing more space. The idea and impact are to increase rentable, salable floor space. There would also be more firms to compete in selling and hiring. How do we know there would be an aggregate increase in supply?

  • Higher density is one test. Untaxing buildings fosters higher density because density, exemplified by high buildings, substitutes capital for land. Untaxing capital obviously makes it more economical.
  • Higher quality is the other test. The richer the new tenants or buyers, the more space is released when they move. This is the hardest point for advocates of the poor to accept. There will always be specific cases where the rich bump the poor, leading to contemptuous names like "trickle-down" that dismiss effects on the market. But the aggregate is what should concern us. If tenants mobilize against new construction, a minority with a vested interest harms everyone else, including the poor. Building new homes for the rich, who can afford them, releases usable space for everyone else.

There are three kinds of slums.

  • Only the narrowest kind, the slum on high-value land, causes eviction of the poor to benefit the rich. Owners in these uncommon areas neglect their buildings, expecting to demolish them for expanding commerce or high-rise apartments.
  • The second kind is on bad land which will stay bad.
  • The third, and most common, kind is on good land with old buildings that have filtered down to people who generate bad neighborhood effects. Units go vacant; land value is low. The market renews these slums not in a stroke, but by nibbling at the fringes. Yet as it nibbles incrementally in, it unavoidably creates more space than it consumes, raising aggregate supply.
The poor also must fear gentrification, in which new gentry displace the poor in the same old buildings. This is one result of not renewing; renewal as such is innocent. It seems carping, too, to criticize people for restoring old buildings. The alternative may be seen in ungentrified neighborhoods, where buildings simply go out of use, sheltering no one. But the ultimate end of Georgist policy is viewed in terms of the nation, pitting cities against each other to attract people.

Nothing is better for people than to be competed for. It raises their bargaining power as tenants, buyers, and workers.

With all that talk of capital and efficiency, remember that we began with a quest for justice in sharing rent surplus. Justice and efficiency are not at odds; we can have both. The trade-off expounded by many economists is to enervate us so we won't do anything. Yet we have shown not just that we can have both, but more; we cannot have either without the other. If we do not share rents in the efficient Georgist manner, social and political pressures will cause inefficient sharing and eventual dissipation.

This is what economic policy can do. The basic impulses, however, the striving for justice and brotherhood, and the sense of personal ethics, come from within, and from family, community, schools, and religion. So does the sense of workmanship, the striving for excellence without which no system works.

There are city councilpersons who can corrupt the best system ever blueprinted. The Georgist program may even help to straighten them out. Lincoln Steffens taught us that the villain in Eden was neither Eve nor the serpent, but the apple! The apples of discord that corrupt city councils are unearned increments to land value, which they create or deny with every decision on extending sewers or changing zoning. Georgist tax dehydrates those apples by attaching higher tax to each unearned increment.

Georgist policy has been shown as a means to revive dying cities, and in the process to reconcile equity and efficiency; to reconcile supply-side economics with taxation; to reconcile capital formation with taxation of the rich. It can be seen as a means of harmonizing collectivism and individualism, in the most constructive ways possible. I know of no other program whose proponents can even make such claims, let alone substantiate them. In a world that has already priced younger people out of the real estate market, we should find George's program worth our intense study and support.


Bottling the Air
In effect, we don’t fine people for emitting, we reward them with a right to continue. Then we can pay them to stop, by buying back the right we just gave away. This is putting the free market to work, they say. If you have not been emitting before, too bad. I have offered not to emit millions of tons of nitrates, and sulfates too. My price is modest, and highly competitive. I underbid the big refineries by 50%, but Air District officials just hang up on me, if you can believe it. They say I must have earned my offset right by suffocating the neighbors in the unregulated past.
...
And those who want to breathe? Coase says they should pay for the privilege, as they pay for indulging any personal taste. After all, they already pay those who supply them with land to live on. Only welfare bums would expect property owners to dip into their hard-earned savings and supply them with free air, when the market has a solution at hand. All they need do is buy offset rights from Ancient and Honorable Emitters. When they want to breathe, they just retire the rights upwind of them. This is a marvel of efficiency, too. They retire only what it takes to clean the air they need: no waste.
...
What about the new-born, with no prior history of either emitting or breathing?   Read the whole article


The Partiality of Indexing Capital Gains (1990)
Now we are witnessing a major effort to revive the exclusion of part or all of capital gains from taxable income, partly on the grounds that much of the gains are "phantom" income, an illusion of inflation. ...

Land is not formed, like capital, by saving and investment; land is not reproducible. For that very reason land tends to appreciate, and therefore has to be a major source of what are misleadingly called "capital" gains. Again for that very reason, there is no supply-side kick in untaxing gains. Most of them are land gains, and should be called that. To use land as a store of value is macro-economically unproductive at best, and on balance counterproductive and destabilizing (considering its effect on financial institutions like the S&Ls). ...

As to borrowing on land, that can be worse than barren when the financial system rises and falls on a land bubble, as it has and is. ...

Ignoring land and its distinctive attributes has the effect of treating land as though it were true, reproduceable capital, to be formed by saving and investing, to be routinely worn out and replaced in the normal course of life and business. It lets advocates of investing and capital formation abuse the legitimate case for macro incentives, exploiting the case to camouflage unearned, nonfunctional rents and increments to land value.

Tantamount to ignoring land is minimizing its weight. Thus one may acknowledge it indulgently, while actually dismissing it. In fact, though, land comprises some half the assessed value of taxable real estate in California, and is not dismissable. Half the assessed value means more than half the market value because of assessment discrimination favoring land. A raft of studies of assessment discrimination, like the sales/assessment ratio studies of the U.S. Census, show consistent patterns of discrimination favoring land. In addition to ordinary assessment discrimination there is much legislated underassessment, for land in forest, farm, country club, and other favored uses. ///

... most of us resident in California have been through one or more years since 1976 when the value of our homes alone rose by more than our annual salaries. ...

We are not pushing for a general wealth tax, but for impartiality and accurate thinking about indexing capital gains, a policy that would protect some forms of wealth, but not others. This apparently temperate, common-sense proposal is in fact partial and discriminatory. Worse, it protects most where the macro social benefits are least. Read the whole article

Cannan's Law

California's Governor-Elect

For better or worse, California has recalled its governor and elected Arnold Schwarzenegger (A.S.) to replace him. A.S. has revealed no specifics of how he will stanch our deficit. He campaigned on generalities: he is against taxes, against waste in government, against measures to rein in vehicle use, and nostalgic about the good old days when Governor Pat Brown was spending heavily on roads and water projects. No one seems sure how he will connect the dots. After his first visit to Sacto last week, he seemed not sure, either.

His choice of advisors, however, tells us A.S. will repeat Pete Wilson's performance from the early 1990s. Chief of Staff Patricia Clarey is a good soldier from Wilson's old staff; Auditor Donna Arduin is from Jeb Bush's Florida. The gurus who set the doctrinal tone give the clearest hints: they are neo-classical economists of deepest dye. These are advisors George Shultz and Michael Boskin from the Hoover Institution. Economics, to them, is a set of dismal choices. California's choice is to cut public services, or lose business and jobs. That is what they told Wilson in 1994. All taxes are the same, always "burdens," always driving away "business."  ...

Boskin and Shultz, posing their dismal choice for California, dismissed by silence that we can raise needed revenues while also spurring job creation and stimulating the economy. It is simple: restore that part of the property tax that falls on land, while continuing to cap the rate on buildings. ...

It is also alleged that land values are too small to support government. Let us test that idea. In 2003, at the current rate, there will be about 15,000 "confirmed" sales of owner-occupied urban California residences at prices over $1 million. That is from DataQuick, a standard source of current real estate data. 15,000 is about 2.7% of all confirmed sales. Some of those go much higher. The mean is probably over $2 million.

Turnover of costlier homes is lower than that of ordinary homes. (For example, turnover of existing homes is 30% greater in Riverside County, with lower values, than in Orange County, with higher values.) 2% a year is a fair guess at the turnover of homes valued at $1 million or more. If so, there are 50 x 15,000, or 750,000 homes in Calif valued at a mean $2 millions. Their aggregate value is 750,000 x $2million = $1.5 trillions.

These are not large buildings: they average 2864 s.f., with 4 bdrms, 3 baths. In the north end of Sta. Monica, a vacant lot alone is over $1m. They are not new buildings: only 9% are new. It's the land that makes them worth so much.

A tax of 1% on that value would yield $15 billions a year. That's from only 2.7% of the urban homes in Calif. The data exclude many sales, country manors, for example. Some well-known lands thus excluded are
  • the Lucas compound and the Pritzker family compound in Marin;
  • San Simeon;
  • the Reagan Ranch and similar holdings in the northern half of Sta. Barbara Cnty;
  • fashionable winery properties in choice valleys statewide;
  • the Chandler family's Tejon Ranch;
  • the 200,000 acres of James Boswell in the Tulare Lake Basin; etc.
There is also the other 97.3% of urban owner-occupied residential real estate. A lot of it is just under $1 million a pop. In Marin County, the median sales price of owner-occupied single-family homes was $700,000 when last seen, and rising. The mean is always higher than the median. Some L.A. County cities with median values just under $1 million include San Marino, Bel Air, Westwood, Brentwood, La Canada, Calabasas, and others. There is also all the other land: commercial, industrial, farm, forest, etc., which is 60% of the assessed property value in California, and a much higher fraction of the real value because it is so egregiously underassessed. ...

A high fraction of California real estate is absentee owned. The Sultan of Brunei, for example, owns several houses and sites in Beverly Hills and Bel Air. California's official Legislative Analyst, the highly respected William Hamm, estimated in 1978 that over fifty per cent of the value of taxable property in California was absentee-owned. ...

Some half of any reduction in California property taxes leaks to out-of-state owners. Nor is this the only leakage. ...

Yet no one has seized on this obvious case to show that local property taxes, substituted for absentee rent payments, creates multiple increases in local income. The whole intellectual apparatus is dominated by absentee investors and used for their benefit.

Many valuable land resources are held by license, rather than title, and escape the property tax almost entirely. ... Read the whole article

Land Rent in a Tax-free Society

Outline of remarks by Mason Gaffney, for use at Moscow Congress, 5/21/96 

1. Rents are a taxable surplus. I estimate that this taxable surplus constitutes 35% or more of the national income in most nations with market economies, and more in resource-rich nations. ...
2. The value of rent is huge. Every economy produces a large excess over wages. To be sure, not all of it is surplus. Some of it goes to replace capital that wears out each year. This is not part of the net surplus, nor income to the capitalist; it is a return of capital. ...

Second, some goes as a return to capital, over replacement. This is pure income. Income to capital is not a taxable surplus, but a functional incentive: it moves people to form and supply capital. This entails securing new capital (by saving, and borrowing) and conserving old capital (avoiding dissaving, and avoiding export of capital).

Capital income serves another useful function: it steers capital into the most productive uses. Steering capital to its best uses has the same useful function as securing new capital, and conserving old. Using capital effectively is as beneficial as securing more capital, and ever so much cheaper. The Great Transition in Russia now is learning to allow income on capital, to secure these benefits. The trick is to do it without allowing more than is needed.

The rest of the excess over wages is captured in the rent of land. It is a true taxable surplus. The amount is already huge, and will become huger yet when existing taxes are abated.

The size of rent is not reported in capitalist nations, except to trivialize it. Their national accountants, dominated by landowners, neglect or conceal it artfully, to protect it from being taxed. Local governments do, however, measure and tax property by value. More than half the value of property is land. In Vancouver, B.C., 73% of the value of all property assessed for taxation is land, even though much land there is exempt from tax, and not assessed at all. In California's major cities it would be just as high if only we assessed land here as accurately as they do there.

3. Rent will become huger yet when you abate taxes presently levied on production and exchange, because these now depress the rent of land. That is, in a tax-free market economy, the benefit of abating present taxes will lodge mainly in land rents. The taxable surplus simply shifts from one form to another.

This is more than a simple shift of a fixed amount. When you substitute land revenues for existing taxes, the surplus actually grows, as if by synergy. You gain more revenue base than you lose, because existing taxes now suppress much latent production. Payroll taxes directly drive workers from taxable jobs to untaxed gains from crime. Abating those taxes will unleash suppressed economic giants, along with all the new surplus values their latent production will generate. "Monetarists" warn you that "there are no free lunches." In fact, however, good policy creates lots of "free lunches." It makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts. Imagine the benefits, alone, of turning people from destructive careers in crime to useful jobs producing goods.

At the same time, the effect of socializing land revenues is to stimulate better land use - the opposite of the effect of existing taxes. Every landowner, to pay the required land charge, is pushed to steer his land to the best use (just as paying interest steers capital to its best use). Thus, the shift to rent-based revenues doubly induces new production: it releases the brake of present taxes, and replaces it with an added push to produce. This is "supply-side economic policy" in the best and truest sense. It generates yet more surplus. You may take all of rent to support government functions, without damaging private market incentives, but only sharpening them.

This policy lets us achieve and reconcile two policies that many now believe are incompatible, viz.: free markets, and common rights in land.

 4. Some of the benefit of abating existing taxes will lodge in higher after-tax wage rates, rather than higher rents. ...

5. Many varieties of natural resources generate rents. City land is the greatest single source. For example, one city, Vancouver, contains half the value of taxable property in B.C. - a province of 934,000 sq. kilometers, or 70% larger than France.

However, many other resources yield rents. Some of them are also huge in value, even though some are inconspicuous. Here are a few varieties of them:

  • access points to transportation (by water, rail, highway, air, etc.);
  • clean air (or the license to pollute it);
  • aircraft time-slots and gates in airports;
  • amenities (good views, warm weather, soft breezes, freedom from pests, riparian access, etc.);
  • aquifers;
  • dam and reservoir sites;
  • water in arid zones;
  • rights of way;
  • preferential use of "common" lands (e.g. street parking in New York);
  • covenants over lands of others (e.g., covenants against competition);
  • easements (e.g. the right to pass over land);
  • fisheries;
  • forests;
  • franchises (exclusive right to sell in certain areas);
  • the gene pool;
  • geothermal energy;
  • grazing;
  • licenses;
  • minerals and gas (rent includes the rise of value of minerals in situ);
  • orbits;
  • some patents (giving effective control over minerals);
  • ability to wield political influence (meetings at private estates; special voting rights);
  • rights of way;
  • foreign holdings and ocean shipping routes protected by national forces;
  • soils;
  • spectrum (radio, TV, communications);
  • legal standing;
  • strata rights;
  • space on the streets;
  • advertising sites;
  • water;
  • wildlife (for hunting, viewing, etc.);
  • wind (for power);
  • zoning permissions; etc.

Some of those varied resources are highly valued. For example,

  • newly minted fishing permits offshore of Washington State sell for $1 million each. Their owners retire and rent the permits to working fishermen, creating an instant class structure where before there was equal opportunity. Imagine the value of an exclusive right to take Caspian sturgeon.
  • Radio spectrum amassed by the McCaw Company recently passed to AT&T for $13 billions.
  • Dmitri Lvov estimates that your oil and gas revenues alone could support the entire national government (Practicable Course of Economic Reforms in Russia. Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, 1994). They might even surpass urban rents in value, if they were valued at world market prices.
  • In arid lands, access to water is life itself. Read the whole article


Canada's System of Revenue Sharing
It seems to me therefore that we need to face up to the question that is known in my trade as Fiscal Federalism, that is, how is money going to be distributed by the federal government out of its so-called surplus, either to people or the States, or localities? ...

The reason it's so hard to sell growth policies at the local level today in the United States is very much due to the fact that the United States federal government taxes people and it gives subventions to landlords. So the landlords can get the subventions without having the people. So who needs people? That's it in a nutshell. We need to reverse that, I think, if we're going to be able to make Georgism work at the local level. ...

At any rate, let's begin by looking at the similarities between the federal systems in the United States and Canada. In both countries we find something called 'vertical balancing' which means that the senior governments send money to the junior governments. We find also something called 'horizontal balancing' which means that the payments are made more to the poorer governments, those that are poorer on a per capita basis, than to richer ones. ...

 ... Cannan's Law. ... But the general idea is, you may think you have tenure control of land but if the municipal government can tax that land and use that money to finance public welfare services, public education and other things that are open to all comers, then you will end up with an uneconomical distribution of population. ...

At the same time, in both countries you find something I will call Hammer's Law. This is not a carpenter's tool but again the name of a man, an economist in Missouri, who observed in 1935 that if you compared population to land values in the different counties of his State (in the very poor counties of the Ozarks the land was hard scrabble land of very little value, with the very rich lands in the north-western part of the State, which resembles Iowa) you found that the population density was much greater on the very poor land of the Ozarks than it was on the very rich land of the northwest. ...

Now another similarity to the two countries us that the subventions that do go from the federal government to the provinces in Canada (and you find a similar thing in the United States) do not come from the richer provinces. They come instead from the general fund, the general taxpayer. There is in other words more vertical balancing than there is horizontal balancing (horizontal balancing you remember means equalization among the different jurisdictions). It's a little like what somebody said about foreign aid. 'Foreign aid is a device by which poor people in rich countries are taxed to subsidize rich people in poor countries.'

We'll see that equalisation in most countries works something like that; that is, in addition to this inter-provincial equalisation, there's a tax shift involved where local sources of taxation like the property tax are being displaced by the federal income tax. I suppose Ferdinand Marcos would be a splendid example of the kind of person I was talking about in the poor country and in West Virginia you have all these coal companies whose owners live in Palm Beach, whose shareholders live in Palm Beach and such places, who benefit from an inter-state equalisation that benefits West Virginia. Well these are similarities.  ...

The federal aid in Canada goes to provinces, whereas in the United States it goes to specific cities, The U.S. Congressman likes to have his fingerprint, as they say, on every dollar that goes from Washington. ... So in the States the idea has been: Tax the States according to their population and then give the money back according to political power. In the United States Senate it means that the smallest State has just as much clout as the biggest State or would have if their senators weren't so merchantable. (I mean, in California when we need something we just look to Nevada or one of those places for a Senator who is having difficulty raising funds for his next election. But that's another story.) ...

But the most delightful distinction about Canadians is the strong and explicit recognition among almost everyone, even if he's an economist, who discusses this subject, that different resource endowments are the basis of inter-provincial differences. Equalisation in Canadian politics means sharing the economic rent. Everybody talks that way. Canadian economists even when they come to the States talk that way. Just as though rent were a permissible word in polite discourse. It's very refreshing. However there's a very selective attitude towards rent -- towards what rents are shareable, I should say.

  • Rents from oil and gas are fair game.
  • Forest revenues are fair game.
  • Mineral revenues of other kinds are fair game.
  • Water power is fair game.

But now how about the rents that are generated by the valuable lands of Montreal, or Toronto, or some of those other big and powerful cities in the east? They are not fair game. As a matter of fact, if you pore through the fine print of the equalization law, which I did on the airplane, you find the most interesting exception to what's included in the formula. I'll explain the formula to you in a moment if you are still awake. ...

Now let's look at the sharing formula. The sharing formula in Canada is essentially based on population and potential tax base. And it can be made to look very complicated but I think I've boiled it down to its essence. You take a province's percentage of the population of Canada, and then you take the percentage of the tax base that it has, subtract that and that gives you another percentage. And then you multiply that times the total tax revenue that's collected throughout Canada from that tax source, and then you pay them that amount out of the provincial treasury. ...

The conclusion of all this is that the Canadian system is really better in terms of its Georgist implications because the payments to the provinces, with all the faults that I've described, are essentially based on population. Population is in the formula. And if you compare this with the way things are done in the States, population plays a very minor role in the formula for equalisation payments in the United States.

Now, how should it be done? Well, there's a well known Georgist economist who figured this out a long time ago and wrote an article about it. His name is Colin Clark. ... He came up with a plan for collecting economic rent at the federal level, and he said what we really should do, and this I think is the ultimate equalisation payment, is we should classify local jurisdictions according to land value per capita, and those that have the least land value per capita, we'll leave all of that land value for them to use for local purposes. But then we will graduate the federal land tax according to the amount of land value per capita in the jurisdiction, and thus we will have a federal tax that automatically achieves inter-regional equity, without all this razzmatazz that I've been describing about inter-regional equalisation payments. Read the whole article


Economics in Support of Environmentalism
  1. Worthy goals often conflict with each other A. Corn vs. Barley B. New rules C. Unresolved conflicts D. Danger of isolation through overkill
  2. The Dereliction of Economists A. Defining away land  B. Private property: from means to end C. Leapfrogging, floating value, and compensation  D. Siege mentalities
  3. Gifford Pinchot's Winning Formula A. Defining "Conservation" B. Finding common ground
  4. Pinchot on "Development"
  5. Urban Sprawl A. Development is not identical with Sprawl   B. Sprawl is not a quest for open space   C. Sprawl is not the product of free choice   D. Looking for Mr. Goodbar   E. The public pays twice  F. Proactive solutions
  6. Dig deep
The hardest choices are those regarding land use, because there is just so much. We can build more houses, cars, and boats, write more music and drama, spawn and educate more people, but we cannot make another Hudson Valley. ... economics shows how the market sorts and arranges land uses, giving us a corn belt, a wheat belt, and a cotton belt. Economists pride themselves on this achievement. (Some preen themselves too much, as we will see, and pride goeth before a fall.)

Sometimes the rich take land from the poor, provoking sympathy, strong rhetoric, and occasionally effective rear-guard resistance to such changes. Actually, a well-oiled market is often quite democratic. People of moderate income, by crowding, can outcompete those of high income for the same land ...

Other worthy goals that conflict are open space and water conservation. ... Something has to give. Thus far it has been wetlands that gave. Once, perhaps, we had too much wetland, but that was long ago. We cannot accommodate all those uses, and save wetlands too, just by having restaurants stop serving water, or putting bricks in toilet tanks. Those are just token or "Goo-Goo" measures for parlor reformers; they distract us from real problems, and substitute for real solutions. What is the highest and best use of water? Wetlands, maybe; more golf courses, maybe not. But we need a rule to gauge "highest and best use." Is it the market? Read on.

Some of the losers in the market game are not willing to grin and bear it. Instead, they write new rules; they want to play a different game. Soilsmen did this long since. They like to classify land and rank it by its potentiality for growing crops. Farming is - to them - the ultimate value, so it is the highest and best use: cities may have what's left over. It is perhaps poetic justice that habitat-savers are now doing the same thing to farmers. They conceive highest use as that which saves endangered species: soils and farming may be damned, right along with housing, commerce, transportation, industry, storage, water supply, waste disposal, fire control, education, religion, mining, government, national defense, recreation, and whatever else needs land. All human activities, and survival itself, need land, so that list is a long one. Each constituent of the other uses becomes an enemy.

Both Soilsmen and habitatspersons have a point, we will see, but they have a fatal weakness. Neither has a system that composes conflict with other worthy goals, including each others'. As to cities, both soilsmen and habitat-savers would direct cities away from low-cost, high-productivity land to the high-cost leftover lands. They would not make this an end in itself, of course, but it is the necessary by-product of downgrading urban usage in the competition for land.

Thus, to restore citriculture and habitat in what is now L.A. we would move the city folks to hazard-prone floodplains, steep slopes subject to fire and erosion, quake-prone fault lines and liquefiable soils, etc. We would also move them away from the center, imposing longer commutes, greater auto-dependency, longer utility lines, longer hauls to dispose of solid wastes, more air to protect, more aquifer surface to protect, more land to protect from flooding, etc. ...

There is another kind of fundamentalist, the private property kind. The economics profession (my tribe) has, in recent years, largely abdicated its proper role as an arbitrator and gone over mainly to the side of private-property extremism. This is the essential meaning of "Neo-classical Economics," which is the idiom of most discourse in the field today, both in business and in the profession.

How did economics get so twisted? Don't blame Adam Smith, or David Ricardo, or John Stuart Mill, or John E. Cairnes, or Knut Wicksell, or Philip Wicksteed, sterling 19th Century writers. Rather, blame J.B. Clark, Karl Marx, Richard T. Ely, Alvin Johnson, Frank Fetter, Frank Knight, George Stigler, and a host of lesser figures who gradually warped economics into its present form. How did they do it?

They wiped out land, resources, nature, and the environment as a separate class for analysis. In official Neo-classical doctrine, the world is an infinite reservoir of raw land and resources. Raw land has no value until man does two things:
    • Man subjects land to private tenure. ...
    • Man improves the raw land, pumping value into it. ...
In a proper view of things, I submit, private property is a means to an end. It is not an end in itself; it needs a functional rationale. The end is to get land put to the best use. All the private land in the world was originally granted by some sovereign public person or body, mainly for that purpose, not as a welfare entitlement. Landowners and their lawyers have slyly, over time, turned the means into an end, a fetish they endow with "sanctity." This is a term they borrowed from absolutist medieval theology. "Sanctity" means the quality or state of being holy or sacred, hence inviolable. It means property may not be challenged, or even questioned. It has become an end in itself, its own voucher. You're not even supposed to think about it, it is above thought. Taboo!

Neoclassical economics, historically, marked the final, total surrender of the profession to this fetish. The modern economist's view runs something like this: "I pledge allegiance to the 14th Amendment, and to the overinterpretation of private landowner supremacy for which it has come to stand." It is ironic to recall that Radical Republicans passed that Amendment, at a time when a "Radical Republican" was one who favored freeing the slaves. The 14th Amendment was designed to protect the rights of freedmen. As interpreted now, the 14th Amendment means that The Emancipation Proclamation itself was unconstitutional! Fortunately, no one has brought that case - yet.

The Neo-classical economists' view of their proper role is rather like that in The Realtor's Oath, which includes a vow "To protect the individual right of real estate ownership." The word "individual" is construed broadly to include corporations, estates, trusts, anonymous offshore funds, schools, government agencies, institutions, partnerships, cooperatives, the Duke of Westminster, the Sultan of Brunei, the Medellin Cartel, Saddam Hussein, congregations, Archbishops, families (including criminal families) and so on, but "individual" sounds more all-American and subsumes them all. This is a potent chant that stirs people to extremes of self-righteousness and siege mentality when challenged.

The resemblance between Neo-classical economics and the Realtor's Oath is easier to understand when you learn that Professor Richard T. Ely, founder of the modern discipline of Land Economics, was heavily subsidized by the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the utilities, the major landowning railroads, and others of like mind and property interests.

When it comes to violating property rights, air pollution today is perhaps the greatest invader and confiscator of property. Where do economists stand? Once a few of them tried to say, following A.C. Pigou, "let the polluter pay," and in parts of Europe they still do. In our modern backward thinking here at home, however, it's not the polluter who is invading the property of others, nor the human rights of those not owning property. Rather, when you tell them to stop, the government is invading their rights. The wage-earning taxpayers must pay them to stop, else you are violating both the 14th Amendment and the "Coase Theorem," a rationalization for polluting now dearly beloved by Neo-classical economists.

Leapfrogging is when developers jump over the next eligible lands for urban expansion, and build farther out, here and there. ...

We have met the enemy, and it is US (Urban Sprawl). Let's analyze this beast, US. ...

Urban sprawl, which creates a psychological effect of great crowding, is not the product of development as such, but of leapfrogging. Leapfrogging means chaos, with development in the wrong places and times. Infilling, on the other hand, is anti-sprawl. It is the cure for sprawl.

A common belief is that the search of open space is the main force behind sprawl. You may test that by observing high density, cookie-cutter subdivisions scattered throughout the land. Within each such development, you are living at urban densities. It is when you get onto the freeway to commute, or shop, or take the kids to school or the dentist, or worship, that you experience open space. You experience it as a negative resource, an obstacle between where you are and where you want to go.

A favorite fallacy is that sprawl results from free individual choice. In fact, sprawl results mainly from subsidies to sprawl, enforced through taxation and/or utility rate regulation. Thus it is imposed, not freely chosen. The classic case, which exemplifies the whole genus, is postal service. It costs you 29¢ to send a letter across the street downtown, or from rural Idaho to rural Florida. The generic name for such subsidies to sprawl is "postage-stamp pricing" (a species of spatial cross-subsidy), which gives you the idea. ...

In British Columbia, people move around a good deal by car-ferry, because of the terrain. The Provincial Government ("The Crown Provincial") runs the system. There are many lovely little islands in the Straits of Georgia, between Vancouver Island and the mainland, favored by the wealthy, the exclusive and reclusive. Being more sybaritic than Henry D. Thoreau, and politically puissant, they have demanded and received car-ferry service. This service costs about $10 for every $1 in revenue. The resulting deficit is covered by raising rates on the main plebeian line, Victoria-Vancouver. Naturally, these cheap ferries attract new visitors to the islands, and new demand for land there.

Here is how we get urban sprawl with leapfrogging. Remember the last time you moved and went househunting? You saw some mouthwatering homes, but they were not for sale. You had to find motivated sellers, and pick from what they offered. It's the same with builders. They scour the exurbs seeking motivated sellers. Ideally the most motivated sellers would line up by distance from the existing city, but the market is not ideal. Each seller is moved by his personal circumstances, not the geographical location.

Potential builders are little concerned with the social costs they might impose, so long as others are to bear them. Thus, they sometimes settle for and build

  • on steep lands (like Malibu Hills) with flammable brush and erosion problems,
  • on flood plains (like Victoria Woods subdivision in Riverside),
  • on soils subject to liquefaction in quakes (like Northridge),
  • in canyons and arroyos,
  • on lands with limited access for emergency equipment.
  • They even build on lands without water supply, even in arid southern California, then demand water and get it, secure in the knowledge that Sacramento rejected a recent move to ban development in areas with no assured water supply. ...
Those are the carrots. A good stick is also needed. We have seen how leapfrogging results from the scattered locations of motivated sellers. We can motivate sellers near-in, and in compact increments as we expand spatially, by raising land taxes there. Proposition 13 makes this difficult, but not impossible: many special assessments have the essential motivating quality of land taxes, with a different legal form, that exempts them from Proposition 13.

I could wax rhapsodic about the results to expect from such taxation, but have done so elsewhere and will leave it with a word: visit Sydney, Adelaide, Brisbane, Copenhagen, or Johannesburg, which have made use of this principle to excellent effect.

These are basic issues, and call for bold actions. Do not waste your time on wimpish meliorism, or "Goo-goo" thinking. For example:
It is said we need a land use inventory. We already have lots of them: people have been classifying land for decades. The question is, what shall we do with them?

It is said we need "risk ratings." These are subject to manipulation and juggling, like benefit/cost analyses of recent ill fame. The question is, who will control the ratings, and to what ends?

It is said we need fire models. We have fire models; they were already chic in 1950. The question is, how to keep scattered homes out of fire-prone areas, where they make prescribed controlled burning nearly impossible. The question is how to keep the State and the fire insurance industry from cross-subsidizing these homes by averaging their risks in with others.

Rather, let us study how to emulate the model of Butchart Gardens, near Victoria, B.C. Butchart doesn't sound like a gardener's name, and sure enough, Mr. Butchart was a hardrock miner who attacked the earth and left a great ugly gash in it. Ah, but Mrs. Butchart, she wanted space for a garden, so she made one there. She rediscovered the truth that land is not just the matter that occupies space, it is space, always renewable and reclaimable. Now Butchart Gardens is one of the world's great beauty spots, drawing visitors from everywhere - in the summertime you hear every language there. Our decayed central cities, too, may bloom again like Mrs. Butchart's garden. Let us make it our model.  read the whole article


Eighteen Fallacies
  [this has the first 7; until I get the other 11, it hasn't been cross-reffed into the themes pages.]
1. "Water rights are real property" ... The evidence is, you do not find water licenses recorded like title deeds to real property. More important, you do not find them on the real estate tax rolls. Never have I heard a licensee demand to be taxed because he holds real property. ...

2. "Real Property is Sacred and Untouchable"  Wrong! Suppose this layman writer and the Oregon Chief Justice were in error, and water permits were real property. That is out of the frying pan, into the fire.

What does 'real' mean, applied to property or estate? It is not the opposite of 'imaginary.' No, 'real' is an elided English form of the French 'regal' taken into English when English kings spoke their native French. Real property is The King's.

We threw out kings in 1783, but not the royal powers. Rather, we transferred those powers to our State governments. By succession, real property means government property!

Every landowner is a tenant of the king or his successors in interest. The very word 'own' comes from 'owe.' An owner is one who owes. What he owed historically was fealty to his sovereign.

That used to mean bending the knee, kissing the royal foot, swearing allegiance, and showing up on demand to smite the enemy.

It has evolved into servitudes like eminent domain, police power, the public trust doctrine, and something else that our lawyers may have glided over, but economists underline: the tax power.

These concepts are basic to common law which has been brought into every U.S. state constitution (save Louisiana's). Moses was not just whistling Dixie when he quoted The Lord as saying "The land shall not be sold forever; for the land is mine, and ye are strangers and sojourners with me." ...

3. "You cannot take real property without compensation"  Wrong! Whoever said that has not been following zoning law. As a rule of thumb, zoning can take away about 85% of the use value of land before it is declared an unconstitutional 'taking' of property.

The owner must be left with some 'economically viable' use, meaning almost any use whose revenues exceed expenses, however small the net gain.

As to other property, well! No one has yet been compensated for losing the fruits of his sweated brow to the IRS, at rates which once soared as high as 90% in the top bracket.

4. "If property falls, America falls" Wrong, at least in my opinion. Property is not an end in itself; it is a means of getting resources put to their best use for the general good.
5. "The cost of water is passed through to consumers in higher prices"  Wrong! At last I'm in my own field. Prices are determined by supply and demand, not cost. If you sell in a national or world market, or even a competitive local market, you are a price-taker, not a price-maker. You can't pass cost hikes on to consumers; you have to eat them. ...

With dearer water you use less by controlling it better, switching from primitive furrow irrigation to sprinklers, spitters and drip.

This in turn lets you do new things like growing avocados on steep hillsides formerly barren, yielding more dollars of product for less water (and in this case on waste land).

The above facts point to a fascinating, portentous corollary: you can tax water withdrawals without wrecking the water economy.

On the contrary, such taxes (carefully crafted to be constructive) can encourage conservation, getting more bins and bales for the bucket, so to speak.

Americans are raised on anti-tax slogans masquerading as economic analysis, always presuming taxes destroy good incentives and wreck the economy.

Here is a kind of tax that raises revenue while strengthening the economy. ...

6. "You can't stop a landowner from pumping on his own land"  Wrong! You can even control his hunting and fishing there, and apply police power. As to pumping, it depends on whether he owns what is under his land.

If it is oil, we all know mineral rights are routinely severed from surface rights by sale, reservation or lease. Water can be subject to constraints, too.   ...

A simple solution to half our tractable water problems would be a severance tax on water withdrawals. If you can regulate it you can tax it.

A tax can be viewed as nothing more than an economic price charged by the owner of water (the state) for using its property. ...

7. "Economics is hostile to environmentalism"

Partly wrong, although some economists are guilty as charged. Economics, properly pursued, deals with how best to meet human wants. Recreation, fishing, wildlife, amenities, clean air, pure water, sustained resource supply, watershed protection, good health, and conservation are legitimate human wants.

Many economists, I confess and deplore, are blind to such values, and think only of maximizing GNP measured in the brutal old-fashioned way, developed during World War II for war's emergency purposes and never revised.

Others, cowed by cow college deans, dare not think at all, and write only of sustaining farm land values: damn the cost to others.

Many others, however, are leaders in developing environmental and resource economics. Today wise environmentalists, rather than sniping at all economists, are allying with the last kind.

Here are four reasons why environmentalists and economists are natural allies.
(a) Economizing is conserving. ...
(b) Subsidy wastes both dollars and ecologies. ...
(c) Correct economic analysis prescribes more water for fish ...
(d) Correct economic analysis presumes public trusts ...

You would be amazed to hear anyone say 'I will pay any price,' There are many documented instances of a person swearing under oath his land is worth no more than $X for tax assessment purpose and soon thereafter swearing again it is worth $15X when being condemned for a park or other public use, because he wouldn't sell it for less.

For Want of a Landlord


Henry George 100 Years Later: The Great Reconciler  
Henry George (1839-1897) is best known today for Progress and Poverty (1879). Eloquent, timely and challenging, this book soon became and remains the all-time best-seller on economic theory and policy.

In 1879, George electrified the world by identifying one underlying cause for two great economic plagues:

  • chronic poverty arising from insufficient demand for labor, and
  • cycles of boom and bust.

These twin plagues arose from concentrated ownership of land, compounded by land speculation. Large landowners and speculators (often one and the same) held the best land idle or underused, forcing labor onto marginal land and driving down wages. Collapse of speculative land price bubbles caused periodic slumps.

(By "land" George meant exclusive rights to use natural resources in a specified territory. It included mining, water, fishing, and timber rights, road and rail rights-of way, and some patents. George emphasized the high value and productivity of urban land, which facilitated communication and trade. Today, we would add to "land" such items as taxi medallions, telecommunications licenses and pollution "rights".)

George followed his analysis with a plausible, practicable remedy: eliminate all taxes except for a tax on land values. The "single tax," as it later became known, would invigorate the economy by breaking up large idle holdings, making land available to those who would use it. And it would suck the air out of speculative bubbles, damping the boom and bust cycle.

  • Taxing land is very progressive because land ownership is highly concentrated among the most wealthy, far more concentrated than income.
  • Taxing land is fair, because the community rather than the individual landowner creates land values.
  • Taxing land is economically efficient, because the owner cannot avoid a land tax ("shift" it) by choosing less-taxed options. ...
George toured the world as an immensely popular political activist, orator and folk hero. He died suddenly in 1897, while running a second time for Mayor of New York City. A hundred thousand mourners marched at his funeral.

In the US, "Georgism" melded into the populist movement, and later into the Progressive Movement. At the national level, the Progressive Movement dominated both major political parties for 17 years, 1902-19. At the local level, its influence continued through the early 1920s. Local property taxation was modified along Georgist lines: land assessments were raised relative to improvements and rates were increased substantially. California water districts financed by land taxes catapulted California to the top-producing farm state in the Union, using land that had been desert or range. California generated farm jobs and homes, while other states destroyed them by allowing well-connected speculators and "robber barons" to grab large tracts of land. A Georgist, Congressman Warren Worth Bailey of Pennsylvania, drafted the first Federal personal income tax law on Georgist lines: falling mainly on very high incomes from property. ...

Neo-classical economists give us only a hard choice: we may have equity, or efficiency, but not both. By contrast, George's program reconciles equity and efficiency. Think of it! George takes two polar philosophies, collectivism and individualism, and composes them into one solution. He cuts the Gordian knot. Like Keynes after him, George inspires us by saying, "Forget the bitter tradeoffs; we can have it all!"    Read the whole article


George's Economics of Abundance: Replacing dismal choices with practical resolutions and synergies

Introduction: Resolutions vs. trade-offs
1. Equity, Efficiency, and Incentives
a. Equity and efficiency
b. Reconciling progressivity and motivation.
2. Reconciling demand side and supply side economics
a. Aggregate. Consumption and production
b. Investing and Saving
3. Micro "structural" reform coupled with macro reform
4. Local, state, and national applications
5. Relieving labor without burdening capital
6. Urban renewal without subsidizing evictions
7. Contains urban sprawl, improves urban linkages among complementary land uses, without overriding market choices.
a. Taxing land sharpens market incentives via the leverage effect noted earlier.
b. Fosters resident ownership, civic participation
8. Reconciles common rights to land with private tenure
9. Paying the debt while also making jobs
10. Making labor cheaper to hire without lowering wage rates
11. Adding people and capital w/o diluting resource base
12. Fostering economy in government in the very process of raising revenue
13. Enhance evironment and conserve resources while making jobs
Summary
A summary of reconciliations
1. Couples equity with efficiency.
2. Couples progressivity with motivation. Abates concentration of wealth and power while widening the scope of productive ambition and enterprise.
3. Makes more jobs without inflation. Raises demand-side and supply-side together, "leveling them upwards."
4. Raises both inducement to invest and inducement to save, at any income level. Also raises saving by raising income level.
5. Couples structural reform and macro reform.
6. May be applied at local, state, and national levels, together or jointly, in small degrees or large.
7. Relieves labor of taxation without burdening capital, and vice versa.
8. Renews cities without subsidizing evictions.
9. Contains urban sprawl, infills and coordinates cities without superimposing planning on the market.
10. Fosters resident ownership and civic participation without laws against absentee ownership, or other use of compulsion, but in the very process of lubricating land markets.
11. Asserts common rights to land while strengthening private tenure. Permits of privatizing without giveaway.
12. Allows paying off public debts while fostering full employment through (true) fiscal stimulus.
13. Makes labor cheaper to hire while raising real wage rates (take-home pay, disposable income). Thus makes jobs without lowering wage rates or "making work."
14. Lets regions, nations, and the world add population and capital without diluting their resource bases.
15. Fosters economy in government in the process of raising revenue.
16. Saves the environment in the process of intensifying land use.
17. Smoothes business cycles without depending solely on contra-cyclical fiscal or monetary policy. Stabilizes and secures financial institutions with only minimal regulation.
18. Effects land reform and redistribution abroad and at home, urban as well as rural, without government expense, and without acreage limitations, working through free markets.
19. Equalizes credit ratings for land buyers without any controls over lenders.
Epilogue: how the public demonstrates its preference for resolutions over dismal choices

It is part of George's genius that his proposals solve one problem by resolving it with another, turning two problems into one solution. It is something like tuning up the orchestra for a concert, turning dissonance into harmony, and keeping the beat together, turning cacaphony into rhythm. It is the mark of good solutions that they reconcile and resolve, rather than simply "trade-off." [If you ever immerse yourself in mathematics deeply enough to find