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Nonpoint Pollution: Tractable Solutions to Intractable Problems Full Employment, Growth And Progress On A Small Planet: Relieving Poverty While Healing The Earth Land as a Distinctive Factor of Production What happens when a state radically slashes its property tax? Two-Rate in Reverse Privatizing Land Without Giveaway Neo-classical Economics as a Stratagem Against Henry George How to Revive a Dying City Bottling the Air The Partiality of Indexing Capital Gains (1990) Cannan's Law California's Governor-Elect Land Rent in a Tax-free Society Canada's System of Revenue Sharing Economics in Support of Environmentalism Eighteen Fallacies For Want of a Landlord Henry George 100 Years Later: The Great Reconciler George's Economics of Abundance: Replacing dismal choices with practical resolutions and synergies Taxation of interjurisdictional e-commerce Interview: Is There a Conspiracy in the Teaching of Economics and History within the American Education System? Megabucks for Negabucks: Solving the Water Crisis Oil and Gas Leasing: a Study in Pseudo-Socialism Property Tax: Biases and Reforms The Relationship Between Property Taxation and the Concentration of Farm Land Ownership Rent Seeking and Global Conflict Rent, Taxation, Dissipation and Federalism Rising Inequality and Falling Property Tax Rates Sounding the Revenue Potential of Land: Fifteen Lost Elements The Red and the Blue The Taxable Capacity of Land The Taxable Surplus of Land: Measuring, Guarding and Gathering It Unearned increments and reality in California's recall election Who Owns Southern California? In Memoriam, Stan Sapiro The Special Challenge to
Economic Thinking
The Search for Surrogates Sources of Nonpoint Pollution What Problems are Created? What Problems are Unsolved by Excise Taxes on Surrogates? The Case of Forestry The Case of Urban Settlement The Case of Agriculture The Common Theme from Forest, City and Farm Solutions Nonpoint pollution goes right to a chink in the armor of conventionally trained economists (like myself) who are overtrained towards becoming protagonists of the price system. To the skeptical we are "free market freaks": eco-freaks who are -nomic rather than -logical. Whatever our faults we are zealous, and carry the conviction of true belief. With the problem at hand, however, we can't do what we do best, that is call for price signals, punt, and slip away. The very name "nonpoint" pollution suggests that economists see this as just an odd bit of clutter, something "non-regular" in their tidy world. Indeed, all pollution was an exception, an "externality," until recently (at least at my age it seems so). Then they learned you can meter effluents and tax them, or trade effluent rights around like private property. Thenceforth they could fit pollution right into existing models and ideologies with minimum intellectual strain. They were happy as Procrustes with a new guest. But we can't meter runoff — how frustrating.
Full Employment, Growth And Progress On A Small Planet: Relieving Poverty While Healing The Earth There is enough land, if only we
use it well. Poverty and
unemployment result from owners’ withholding better lands from
full or any use, creating an artificial and specious scarcity of land
relative to population. Read the whole article
Land as a Distinctive Factor of Production A.
Primary Distinctions
A-1. Land is not produced nor reproducible A-2. Land as site is permanent and recyclable A-3. Land supply is fixed a. The overall planet is
fixed. | b. Land is fixed within political
jurisdictions. | c. Land as site is immobile in space,
permanently. |
d. Land is fixed in form. | e. Acquiring land must mean taking others'.
A-4. Land is immobile in
space and uncontrollable in time
a. Land does not migrate.
| b. Land values are marked by
continuity in space | c. The services of land flow and perish with
time. | d. Land is not uniform to a user or firm. |
e. Land is not
uniform to a city or economy | f. Land
division is a highly social
process. | g. Nuclei are interdependent. | h. Land is immobile among
taxing jurisdictions.
A-5. Land does not turn
over, but rather is recycled and is versatile
a. Land is not convertible into
other land. | b. Land is necessarily
versatile. | c. Land per se is economically divisible, unlike
capital.
| d. Capital evinces "economies of simultaneity" in construction.
A-6. Land is not
interchangeable with capital
A-7 Land rents are subject to common forces that differed from and are generally reverse to those that determine interest rates (the price of capital. A-8. Land price guides investors and determines the character of capital, as capital substitutes for land A-9. Land is limitational A-10. Land value is not an economic fund B. Major Economic Consequences B-1. The origin of property in land is not economic a. Politics guides the original
distribution.
i)
The right to sell was won by force, is not universally honored, and
must be kept by continuous use of force.
b. Privatization
is dominated by giveaways and resultant "rent-seeking,” which warps
allocation. ii) In practice, selling for cash up front reserves most land for a few with front-money advantage, inside information, good contacts, corrupt aides, etc. iii) The ability to bid high does not necessarily come from legitimate saving. c d. WTA vs. WTP survey findings; their relevance and import. B-2. Much land remains
untenured
B-3. Landownership imparts superior bargaining power B-4. Land Rent does not evoke production, thrift or investment a. Land rent does not determine
interest rates. | b.
Existence of land value actually lowers saving rates. |
i) Land
value substitutes for real capital in portfolios and thus lowers the
need to create real capital. | ii)
Rising land prices are net
income to individuals. | c. Investing in land is macro-economically
sterile. | d. Public policy
needs to promote capital formation but not land creation. | e. Land
price is unrelated to cost of producing land.
B-5. Land rent is a
taxable surplus
a. Relative elasticities. |
b. The surplus is much more than usually stated.
B-6. Uniformity in
taxation between land and capital is not neutral
a. Land and capital are
non-interchangeable, and mutually exclusive. |
b. Taxing capital is non-neutral per se. | c. It is impossible to tax
capital uniformly. | d. It is impossible and undesirable to tax
consumption uniformly.
B-7. Land values are
hypersensitive to discount rates
B-8. Land markets are dominated by access to long-term credit a. Financing purchase ranges
from difficult to impossible. | b. Land
purchase is not self-liquidating. | c.The corollary of high land
price
is high carrying cost relative to cash flow. | d. Credit barriers are
barriers to equimarginal allocation of land.
B-9. Control of land
gravitates to financially "strong hands"
a. Landownership accretes around
existing nuclei. | b. It follows that landownership is highly
concentrated.
B-10. Land markets are
sticky
a. Weak seller motivation.
| b. Waiting for Godot. | c. Limited
competition. | d. Lags in reallocation. | e. Lack of homogeneous
land.
| f Lack of turnover. | g. Hoarding for vertical integration. | h.
Assembly. | i. Institutional stickiness.
B-11. Land is a major
basis of market power
a. Expansion is zero-sum. | b.
Land is a natural base for monopoly and
monopsony. | c. The differentiation of land is permanent. | d.
Local
market power. | e. Land is the basis of cartels. | f Land puts the lock
on monopoly.
B-12. Land income is much
greater than the current cash flow
a. Appreciation is current
income. | b. Landowning yields large
non-cash service flows. | c. Land income is a prior claim, not a
"residual." Cf. A- 14. | d.Land income is a large share of
national
income.
B-13. Consuming land means
preempting its time
B-14. Land's rent is its opportunity cost, regardless of use B-15. Land value is hypersensitive to the environment (Canary in the mine) B-16. LAND USES THAT STINT ON LABOR SPELL UNEMPLOYMENT B-17. THE LAND-SURFEIT OF SOME, WHEN UNCONSTRAINED, SPELLS HOMELESSNESS FOR OTHERS C. Land-driven Booms and Busts C-1. LAND VALUATION IS SUBJECTIVE C-2. Land value is used as the basis of credit and money C-3. Land markets are prime causes of instability a.
Land prices move in cycles of high amplitude. |
b.
Investors respond to high land-price by forming land-saving capital,
i.e. substituting capital for land. It is useful to distinguish
five
forms this substitution takes (cf A-6, where these points are outlined).
i)
Land-saving capital, like high buildings.
ii) Land-enhancing capital, meaning capital used to improve land for a new, higher use. iii) Land-linking capital, like canals and rails and city streets. iv) Land-capturing (rent-seeking) capital, like squatters' improvements, and canal and rail lines built to secure land grants, and dams and canals built to secure water rights. v) Rent-leading capital. c.
Land-saving capital is well above average in durability.
SUMMARY
Read the whole article
... Hundreds of books on economic theory are published with "land" absent from the index. ... The discipline has not totally eliminated land, but marginalized it. The discipline has not totally terminated land: it is too subtle for outright skullduggery, preferring equivocation and confusion. Rather, it has marginalized it. There is a subdiscipline called "Land Economics," and a journal of that name. There are journals of Agricultural Economics, Urban Economics, Regional Science, Environmental Economics, Natural Resources, and more. There are also whole disciplines of Geography, Economic Geography, Military Science, Biogeography, Geology, Geometry, Surveying, Astronomy, Theology, Ecology, Oceanography, Meteorology, Soils, Physiography, Topography, and Hydrology, all dealing with The Earth and Nature and Creation as definable topics distinct from man's works. ... Common micro theory finesses Time. It deals with economic relations as though they occurred at a point in time (and space as well); as though they were relations of coexistence, rather than a cavalcade of events in sequence. Sometimes two points are allowed (short run and long). Thus micro theory can ignore the birth of capital, its growth, maturity, senescence, death, burial, and replacement, vital elements of its difference from land. Time, and relations of sequence, are hived off to the far satellite of "finance," usually not even taught in departments of economics. Time is also referred to under "history of economic thought," as an obsession of some 19th century Austrians who wrote quaintly of "roundabout" (time-using) methods of production.5 Relations of sequence are found in macro, but not firmly integrated with microtheory, which is the enduring core of the discipline. Microtheory still deals with relations of coexistence in time, and space as well. As A. A. Milne once wrote, "It isn't really anywhere, it's somewhere else instead." Of neoclassical theory we may add, "It isn't really anytime, it's some other time instead."6 ... "Land" in economics means all natural resources and agents, with their sites (locations and extensions in space). Land is not just the matter occupying space: it is space. It includes many things not colloquially called land, such as
Economic land excludes many
things, too, that are
colloquially called land. It excludes land-fill, for example, by
which many cities
are extended into shallow waters. The site and seabed are
properly
land; the land-fill is an improvement. There is no "made
land" in the economic sense: it is reallocated from other
uses. Expanding cities take farmland from producing food and
fiber,
much of it for the expanding city itself. Filled land in shallow
water near cities is taken away from anglers and sailors and viewers
and
ecologists, who now routinely organize to prevent it being "made"
away with. Drained and filled
wetlands are taken away from endangered species, as well as from their
primal role as
filters protecting coastal waters from river trash and
pollutants.
Thanks to the myopia and dereliction of economists, it has taken
militant
environmentalists to carry home this truth, developing in their
struggle
to be heard and understood a deep skepticism of economists and their
"way of thinking." Some economists and environmentalists are now coming
to terms with each other, after decades of mutual shunning. Too
many modern economists, however, still use their "way of thinking" to
seal out important new evidence that doesn't fit the model. ...
Capital occupies space; land is space. In common micro theory, resources and markets come together at a point not just in time but in space. Again, it excludes from its purview one of the prime qualities of land.6 6.
For the reasons given, alone, land and capital are mutually exclusive. There are, however, nine more, which follow. ... Read the whole article Land as "site" (location plus extension) does not normally wear out, depreciate, spoil, obsolesce, nor get used up by human activities incident to occupancy and production. In contrast, capital depreciates from time and use, routinely and by nature. After being formed, it must be conserved from entropy by continual maintenance, repair, remodeling, safeguarding against theft and fire, and so on.7 Like our own bodies, it returns to dust; land is the dust to which it returns. Inventories are depleted; moving parts wear out; fixed capital depreciates with use and time. ... It follows that the demand for land arises over time with incomes, but faster than incomes. ... Land value in cities may be defined as "what is left after a good fire"; arsonists take that quite literally. ... Read the whole article What happens when a state radically slashes its property tax? Michiganders are saying they must wait and see, but there is no need for that: California can show you 17 years of experience. To read your future, just study our past. Here is what has happened since California passed Proposition 13 in 1978. The obvious direct results have
been to cut public services, raise
other taxes, and lose credit rating. ...
The private sector is doing badly, too. Raising income taxes, business taxes, and sales taxes is no way to stimulate an economy; they are all a drag on work and enterprise. ... It should give one pause. It is, however, if you think about it, the expectable result of what the voters did.
The predictable result is to
inhibit economic activity, and
encourage holding wealth inert and stagnant.
David Shulman tersely summarized the distributive effects of Prop. 13 as he left us for Salomon Brothers in Manhattan: "it breached the social compact." ... 1/8 of all new businesses started in the U.S. were in L.A., 1945-50. These were small, creative, flexible, and too varied to classify. No Linnaeus could sort them in conventional categories: the new Angelenos simply stayed here and started producing everything for themselves, some things previously imported, and others never seen before. ... Why is that not happening today, 1995? An invisible, pervasive change is Proposition 13, which makes it possible to hold land at negligible tax cost. In 1945 land was taxed at 3% every year, building a fire under holdouts to turn their land to use. Today that same tax cost is well below 1%. Using Gwartney's Rule of Thumb, it is about 1/8 of 1%: a rate of 1% applied to 1/8 of the true value. Landowners are only taxed now
if they use their land to hire
people and produce something useful. Then they meet the drag of our
high business and employment and sales taxes, necessitated by the
fall of property taxes. A handful of oligopolistic landowners control
most of the market; small businesses are squeezed out. This helps us
segue from being at the cutting edge of industrial progress to a
third-world economy - from the NH model to the AL model - with little
relief in sight. ... California displayed amazing
growth up to 1978, and the resilience
to shrug off the loss of war industries after 1945 and still grow
"explosively" (as Jane Jacobs put it). After 1978 we have a string of
reverses. The timing, along with a priori causative analysis, plus
various direct observations too numerous for this time-slot, support
an hypothesis that the reverses were aggravated by Prop. 13.
Michigan, be warned of our lot, and learn about taxes from us:
"This Could Happen to You." Read
the whole article
Two-Rate in Reverse In 1955, Spiro Agnew was a
Maryland State Assemblyman on the rise.
He carried a new law that let tax assessors value farmland on its
"use-value" as farmland, instead of market value. It let owners who
were farming for unearned increments around Baltimore and D.C. hold
out with low carrying costs. "Farmland" meant land used for
farming,
and any play at farming would qualify. Under this law, a relative of
mine with 102 acres in Maryland near Western Avenue, the D.C. line,
kept just two steers thereon to validate his farmland assessment
status. Holding for the rise "never crossed his mind." Right --
except, whenever such land is condemned for public use, courts
everywhere have held that compensation must be based on speculative
market value. ...
It is not just peri-urban land speculators who gain. A large chunk of land value in rural regions is not based on cash flow from food and fiber, but on amenities. Wisconsin is a major playground for rich urbanites from nearby Chicago, Milwaukee, Minneapolis and St. Paul. "Use-value" assessment exempts this chunk of value completely, for use-value is based on capitalizing the net cash farm income from growing crops, and, in the Wisconsin law, specifically corn. The highest land values per capita in the State are in Vilas County up in the north woods, once dismissed as worthless "cutovers." Vilas' barren podzol soils are worthless for corn, but sparkling lakes bedizen the County. Values per capita in Vilas are 6 times those in Milwaukee. Rich recreationists and "investors" (read speculators) are gobbling up the "wild forties." Shoreline parcels are like diamonds among coal. ... 100 years ago, American Georgists made a big point that city land outvalues rural land many times over. One implication is that taxing city land is taxing the rich, and we can ignore farmland. Some land-taxers counsel that farmers are easily misled to oppose us, so leave them alone and convert the cities. But rich city folks also own choice rural lands.
those are a few
of the struggling family
farmers whom use-value assessment of farmland saves from destitution.
The privilege of use-value assessment stretches even beyond farmlands, vast as they are. Timberland in most states gets the same preferred treatment, only better. About 1/3 of the privately owned land in the U.S. is in timber. In California, owners (mostly huge corporations) may put the land into the "TPZ" class. The standing timber is then exempt, and taxed only at harvest, at 2.9%, much too low a rate to make up for a 60-year lifetime of exemption. County assessors have to value the land separately on its putative value for growing timber, following a State-legislated formula that is tailored drastically to understate even that low value (California Revenue and Tax Code, Section 434.5). Much of that land, though, has alternative uses, e.g. for retirement and vacation homes and resorts, the outliers and pioneers of urban sprawl. There are also mineral values, hunting, fishing, rifle ranges, grazing, campsites, tourism, rights of way, lumber camps, loading sites, water sources, lakes, log storage, landings - there are many things to do with 1/3 of a nation's land. Those uses are all declared "compatible" with timber, hence land values derived therefrom are tax-exempt. Read the whole article Privatizing Land Without Giveaway Neo-classical Economics as a Stratagem Against Henry George (in The Corruption of Economics, London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1994) The Imperative to Put Down Henry
George
The crabbed spirit of neo-classical economics Popular responsiveness to problem-solvers Henry George as reconciler and problem-solver
Blight is not restricted to stagnant or declining cities. In booming Los Angeles, there is Watts. In nearby Riverside, one of the fastest growing cities in the nation, the CBD [Central Business District] is surrounded by blight which, among other things, frustrates years of subsidies aimed at reviving the moribund CBD itself. These extreme cases are not anomalies, not simply ghettoes and embarrassments; they are symptoms of systemic malfunction. They could be portents and symbols for the rest of the economy. Blight may be defined as failure to maintain, replace, and renew capital inherited from the past. Studies indicate that all of American industry faces this problem, compared with vigorous foreign competitors. In learning to cure blight, we may learn to restore the greatness and pride of this whole troubled nation. There is also good news: some cities have risen from the grave. Indeed, all land development is resurrection in a sense: all land has been used before for something. The history of a city lot usually shows that there were several antecedent improvements, layered like the ruins of ancient Troy. The goal should be to make renewal happen faster and more widely, while we are still here to benefit. ... Some cities should be abandoned. Towns around played-out mines are obvious examples. A farm town becomes redundant when new roads let customers patronize a larger or better town. Salvage what you can and move on. Some would apply the same logic to all cities. Dead cities aren't lost, they say, but rebuilt elsewhere; they were cash cows that have been milked dry. Their depreciation allowances are reinvested on new frontiers; people and vitality move with the capital. It is an important half-truth, but a half-truth is also half wrong. The basic original site stays put; land cannot move. Public and private social capital cannot move, either. We cannot afford throwaway cities in a finite world. New natural sites are not common. There is only one Hudson Valley with only one mouth, and here New York City has stood for 350 years. We cannot abandon the Bronx and duplicate its environment somewhere; we cannot rebuild the natural setting, and the sunk social capital is too costly. Relocating to suburbs involves commuting cost in terms of money and congestion. And then, when we tire of the new suburbs, where will we go next? Furthermore, blighted areas have
high potential market values.
Picture a topographic map of a city where the contour lines represent
points not of equal elevation, but of equal market value per square
foot. The peaks, the Everests and McKinleys, are in the city retail
centers, where just one square foot rises to $2,000 (about $90
million per acre). Land just a few miles away from dizzying altitudes
can hardly be worthless. Harlem is near Park Avenue; Watts is near
Beverly Hills; South State Street is very near the Sears Tower.
Newark is 15 minutes by train from Manhattan. Newark office rents are
$25/sf per year. That is less, of course, than in Manhattan, but in
Riverside, California, we are throwing up offices to get rent of
$12/sf per year, while Newark stagnates.
George saw cities as foci of civilization's basic mechanisms. People with mutual access, associating on equal terms, expedite cooperation and specialization through the market. Multivariate interactions are synergistic. Indeed, while each parcel is developed in the stage of decreasing returns, the composite city is generally in a stage of increasing returns, thanks to synergy: the whole exceeds the sum of its parts, and increases to the whole yield more than the sum of increases to the parts. Synergistic surplus, said George, lodges in urban land rents. Thus he explained a phenomenon which other economists overlooked: the unparalleled rise in urban rents and land prices, and in owners' wealth and power. ... To understand ground rents and land prices is to understand cities; not to understand is to remain mired forever in confusion and fallacy. Ground rent continues forever, generally tending to rise; therefore, to buy title to land, people pay prices that look high relative to current cash flows. .... Urban land prices take your breath away. Land
prices vary extremely from city to city or block to block.
The cost to build a square foot of floor space is fairly constant
from place to place, but demand varies with location. A small
rise in
floor rental translates into a large rise in ground rent and land
price, because the land owner gets everything above what is required
to operate and amortize the building. Thus,
At key locations in bigger
cities, land prices are not just high
per square foot, they are higher per capita than in small cities.
They are even higher relative to building values, in spite of the
high-rise buildings. Remember that each additional floor adds more
ground rent, because floor space rental is more than enough to cover
the added cost.
Land prices across cities and neighborhoods are much more differentiated than other measures economists commonly cite. For example, the median income in upper east side Manhattan is about 8 times higher than north of Central Park, while the price of land per square foot is probably 40 times higher. Urban land is also highly concentrated in ownership; a handful of people and corporations own most of it. A growing share of income property is held by wealthy aliens, who want to diversify and acquire secure wealth they can manage by remote control. Aliens even hold a good deal of residential property in international "jet set" communities. Because
urban rents are a social surplus, not a payment for
anyone's making or supplying land, parties other than the landowner
have a claim. A good deal of American politics deals with how to
assert that claim and share in the surplus.
Dividing a big pie seems a pleasant enough task, but Confucius knew better: "It is easier to face a common enemy than to share a surplus." The common ways of sharing surplus are clumsy, divisive, and destructive; they bear some responsibility for dead cities. With too much quarreling over spoils, there are no spoils to dispute. Consider how spoils are shared, and how we might do better.
Economists call such schemes "postage stamp pricing," because postal rates do not vary with delivery costs. Manhattan has 64,000 residents per square mile; Montana has 5.4. It costs a lot more to collect or deliver mail in Montana. The reason postal rates rise is that the U.S. urban population is spreading out more like Montana and less like Manhattan (which once had over 100,000 per square mile). Here are five other examples:
The key to renewing cities is
shifting from obstructive ways of
sharing rent, like rent control; and destructive ways, like looting
and subsidies; to constructive ways. Henry George showed us how
equity and efficiency go hand in hand, how the magic of justice
combines with the magic of incentive.
"Higher
Taxes that Promote Development." The fixed tax is levied on land
value, based on opportunity cost. The owner uses land harder and
improves it more to meet a fixed tax; or sells, releasing surplus
land to those needing more space. Taxes stifle enterprise only if
they increase with enterprise. Land tax increases only with
opportunity cost, which is independent of the enterprise of the
owner. The only activity this tax impairs is withholding land from
use.
George's land tax promotes equity toward the landless in at least four ways:
This is supply-side economics
with a kick. ... George's program not only reconciles efficiency
and equity, it squares taxes and incentives. What more can we ask of
economic policy than to resolve stand-offs that have confused us, and
dead-locked constructive action, for generations? ...
Camden has the highest tax rate in New Jersey, causing a vicious circle as high rates drive away capital and further erode the tax base. What if only land value were taxed? The depressant would become a stimulant by the simple magic of converting a variable charge into a fixed, unavoidable one. So it is with most depressed cities, which today look vainly to Washington for salvation. They need enabling legislation from their states, on the Pennsylvania model, but given this power can save themselves. The counterpart of sharing rent through taxation is to untax things, like buildings, that involve human endeavor. This doubles the incentive effect. If land tax is the stick, untaxing buildings is the corresponding carrot, and George's program makes both larger. Every lot with an old "Defender" building has a potential replacement, the "Challenger." Taxing buildings rigs the fight against the Challenger. Say the lot-cum-Defender is worth $100K, and the Challenger would cost $500K to build. Challenger cash flow must exceed Defender cash flow by enough to pay $500K, plus added taxes based on it. Georgist tax, by contrast, is
impartial between Defender and
Challenger; the market decides.
New buildings face liquidity crises; almost all are built on credit and need time to yield cash. The timing of tax on a building maximizes the damage during the crisis period, for any given tax yield over time. Of course, every building uses public services, but new buildings in older cities pay for more than they receive, while old ones receive more than they pay for. Think of building tax as a forced loan to the Treasury, to be recovered when the building is older. What could be more counterproductive than forcing a loan from a builder passing through a credit crisis? The Georgist tax is low when the builder's cash needs are pressing, and rises slowly over time as the site ripens to its next best use. Urban blight is cumulative and self-reinforcing: blighted buildings cast a pall on land around them, discourage upkeep, and stifle renewal. Whatever slows renewal of one site slows the neighborhood in a vicious, downward spiral. Conversely, new buildings stimulate renewal. There are exceptions; some new buildings sterilize blocks with blank walls. But the exception is not the rule, and abuse is not the precept. The rule is that new buildings draw tenants from old and weaken other Defenders, so that other owners also renew. When they do, where better than next to the newest building? Renewal, like blight, is cumulative, but in a benign, upward spiral. Competition for sites raises the tax base if land values are derived from ground rents. The higher base allows the city to improve public services without taxing buildings or scaring away generators of fiscal surpluses. In this scenario, buildings raise the tax base indirectly, by raising the value of land around them. Riverside built a downtown pedestrian mall when they were in vogue, and has been sorry ever since. It did not work; retailers deserted, and half the stores are empty. I asked the developer of a successful mall why he thought downtown failed, and got a two word answer: "absentee ownership." I should have known, having preached it for years. Farm advisers say, "The best dressing for soil is the owner's shadow, applied daily." In town they ask, "Who's keeping the store?" Absentees aren't the only negligent owners, nor are they all bad. Torpid owners are the problem, and they come in many forms. A city wants to be rid of owners who see real estate as a cash cow for their retirement, and to replace them with owners who see it as a vehicle for enterprise and who apply their shadows daily. The shadows follow them to local civic clubs and to enterprising downtown or neighborhood associations for making joint improvements. The surplus to land attracts outside buyers. Absentees, redundant parties in production, are often top bidders for pure ownership, which is the legal right to receive land rent plus unearned increments that accrue over time. Georgist taxation cuts directly into rents and unearned increments, which attract absentee owners; it spares the rewards of enterprise. It thereby effects a market transfer of ownership from absentees to occupants, with the community benefits that follow. In a period of rising concern over alien takeovers of U.S. real estate, these points merit focused attention. Untaxing buildings attracts
outside capital to an area, but does
not result in new capital formation for the economy. In Keynesian
models, however, reducing tax on new capital raises the rate of
return after taxes (marginal efficiency of capital) and creates new
capital. In supply-side models, increasing saving is more important.
Land taxation helps here, too.
Land taxation, if vigorously applied, tends to reduce the investment value of land, through a process called "tax capitalization." With land devalued, those needing wealth acquire substitute assets by saving more, and investing the savings in real new capital rather than land. Georgist taxation tends to
reduce the need for public spending in
two obvious ways.
"Slum clearance" in the 1950s
had a negative caste, with a name
catered solely for middle class consumption. Reuse of cleared land
was often at lower density, inevitably throwing unhoused people on
the private market. Federal "urban re-newal" in the 1960s, while
better named, emphasized clearing, not rebuilding. The inventory of
cleared, unrebuilt land under the program grew each year. Cynics'
cracks of "bombing out" and "Negro re-moval" were on the mark, though
blacks were not the only evictees. Any talk of demolition and renewal
evokes the specters of those cruel, wasteful programs.
But George's program begins with fostering renewal and intensive use. Clearance is involved only to serve renewal, never as a goal in itself. The first land taken would generally be vacant or with boarded-up buildings. New buildings would draw renters and buyers from old ones, releasing more space. The idea and impact are to increase rentable, salable floor space. There would also be more firms to compete in selling and hiring. How do we know there would be an aggregate increase in supply?
There are three kinds of slums.
The poor also must fear gentrification, in which new gentry
displace the poor in the same old buildings. This is one result of
not renewing; renewal as such is innocent. It seems carping, too, to
criticize people for restoring old buildings. The alternative may be
seen in ungentrified neighborhoods, where buildings simply go out of
use, sheltering no one. But the ultimate end of Georgist policy is
viewed in terms of the nation, pitting cities against each other to
attract people.
Nothing
is better for people than to be competed for. It raises
their bargaining power as tenants, buyers, and workers. With all that talk of capital and efficiency, remember that we began with a quest for justice in sharing rent surplus. Justice and efficiency are not at odds; we can have both. The trade-off expounded by many economists is to enervate us so we won't do anything. Yet we have shown not just that we can have both, but more; we cannot have either without the other. If we do not share rents in the efficient Georgist manner, social and political pressures will cause inefficient sharing and eventual dissipation. This is what economic policy can do. The basic impulses, however, the striving for justice and brotherhood, and the sense of personal ethics, come from within, and from family, community, schools, and religion. So does the sense of workmanship, the striving for excellence without which no system works. There are city councilpersons who can corrupt the best system ever blueprinted. The Georgist program may even help to straighten them out. Lincoln Steffens taught us that the villain in Eden was neither Eve nor the serpent, but the apple! The apples of discord that corrupt city councils are unearned increments to land value, which they create or deny with every decision on extending sewers or changing zoning. Georgist tax dehydrates those apples by attaching higher tax to each unearned increment. Georgist policy has been shown
as a means to revive dying cities,
and in the process to reconcile equity and efficiency; to reconcile
supply-side economics with taxation; to reconcile capital formation
with taxation of the rich. It can be seen as a means of harmonizing
collectivism and individualism, in the most constructive ways
possible. I know of no other program whose proponents can even make
such claims, let alone substantiate them. In a world that has already
priced younger people out of the real estate market, we should find
George's program worth our intense study and support.
Bottling the Air In effect, we don’t fine people
for emitting, we reward them
with a right to continue. Then we can pay them to stop, by buying
back the right we just gave away. This is putting the free market to
work, they say. If you have not been emitting before, too bad. I have
offered not to emit millions of tons of nitrates, and sulfates too.
My price is modest, and highly competitive. I underbid the big
refineries by 50%, but Air District officials just hang up on me, if
you can believe it. They say I must have earned my offset right by
suffocating the neighbors in the unregulated past.
... And those who want to breathe? Coase says they should pay for the privilege, as they pay for indulging any personal taste. After all, they already pay those who supply them with land to live on. Only welfare bums would expect property owners to dip into their hard-earned savings and supply them with free air, when the market has a solution at hand. All they need do is buy offset rights from Ancient and Honorable Emitters. When they want to breathe, they just retire the rights upwind of them. This is a marvel of efficiency, too. They retire only what it takes to clean the air they need: no waste. ... What about the new-born, with no prior history of either emitting or breathing? Read the whole article The Partiality of Indexing Capital Gains (1990) Now we are witnessing a major
effort to revive the exclusion
of part or all of capital gains from taxable income, partly on the
grounds that much of the gains are "phantom" income, an illusion of
inflation. ...
Land is not formed, like capital, by saving and investment; land is not reproducible. For that very reason land tends to appreciate, and therefore has to be a major source of what are misleadingly called "capital" gains. Again for that very reason, there is no supply-side kick in untaxing gains. Most of them are land gains, and should be called that. To use land as a store of value is macro-economically unproductive at best, and on balance counterproductive and destabilizing (considering its effect on financial institutions like the S&Ls). ... As to borrowing on land, that can be worse than barren when the financial system rises and falls on a land bubble, as it has and is. ... Ignoring land and its distinctive attributes has the effect of treating land as though it were true, reproduceable capital, to be formed by saving and investing, to be routinely worn out and replaced in the normal course of life and business. It lets advocates of investing and capital formation abuse the legitimate case for macro incentives, exploiting the case to camouflage unearned, nonfunctional rents and increments to land value. Tantamount to ignoring land is minimizing its weight. Thus one may acknowledge it indulgently, while actually dismissing it. In fact, though, land comprises some half the assessed value of taxable real estate in California, and is not dismissable. Half the assessed value means more than half the market value because of assessment discrimination favoring land. A raft of studies of assessment discrimination, like the sales/assessment ratio studies of the U.S. Census, show consistent patterns of discrimination favoring land. In addition to ordinary assessment discrimination there is much legislated underassessment, for land in forest, farm, country club, and other favored uses. /// ... most of us resident in California have been through one or more years since 1976 when the value of our homes alone rose by more than our annual salaries. ... We are not pushing for a general wealth tax, but for impartiality and accurate thinking about indexing capital gains, a policy that would protect some forms of wealth, but not others. This apparently temperate, common-sense proposal is in fact partial and discriminatory. Worse, it protects most where the macro social benefits are least. Read the whole article Cannan's Law California's Governor-Elect For better or worse, California has recalled its governor and elected Arnold Schwarzenegger (A.S.) to replace him. A.S. has revealed no specifics of how he will stanch our deficit. He campaigned on generalities: he is against taxes, against waste in government, against measures to rein in vehicle use, and nostalgic about the good old days when Governor Pat Brown was spending heavily on roads and water projects. No one seems sure how he will connect the dots. After his first visit to Sacto last week, he seemed not sure, either. His choice of advisors, however, tells us A.S. will repeat Pete Wilson's performance from the early 1990s. Chief of Staff Patricia Clarey is a good soldier from Wilson's old staff; Auditor Donna Arduin is from Jeb Bush's Florida. The gurus who set the doctrinal tone give the clearest hints: they are neo-classical economists of deepest dye. These are advisors George Shultz and Michael Boskin from the Hoover Institution. Economics, to them, is a set of dismal choices. California's choice is to cut public services, or lose business and jobs. That is what they told Wilson in 1994. All taxes are the same, always "burdens," always driving away "business." ... Boskin and Shultz, posing their
dismal choice for California,
dismissed by silence that we
can raise needed revenues while also
spurring job creation and stimulating the economy. It is simple:
restore that part of the property tax that falls on land, while
continuing to cap the rate on buildings. ...
It is also alleged that land values are too small to support government. Let us test that idea. In 2003, at the current rate, there will be about 15,000 "confirmed" sales of owner-occupied urban California residences at prices over $1 million. That is from DataQuick, a standard source of current real estate data. 15,000 is about 2.7% of all confirmed sales. Some of those go much higher. The mean is probably over $2 million. Turnover of costlier homes is lower than that of ordinary homes. (For example, turnover of existing homes is 30% greater in Riverside County, with lower values, than in Orange County, with higher values.) 2% a year is a fair guess at the turnover of homes valued at $1 million or more. If so, there are 50 x 15,000, or 750,000 homes in Calif valued at a mean $2 millions. Their aggregate value is 750,000 x $2million = $1.5 trillions. These are not large buildings: they average 2864 s.f., with 4 bdrms, 3 baths. In the north end of Sta. Monica, a vacant lot alone is over $1m. They are not new buildings: only 9% are new. It's the land that makes them worth so much. A tax of 1% on that value would
yield $15 billions a year.
That's from only 2.7% of the urban homes in Calif. The data exclude
many sales, country manors, for example. Some well-known lands thus
excluded are
There is also the other 97.3%
of urban owner-occupied
residential real estate. A lot of it is just under $1 million a
pop. In Marin County, the median sales
price of owner-occupied
single-family homes was $700,000 when last seen, and rising. The
mean is always higher than the median. Some L.A. County cities with
median values just under $1 million include San Marino, Bel Air,
Westwood, Brentwood, La Canada, Calabasas, and others. There is also
all the other land: commercial, industrial, farm, forest, etc., which
is 60% of the assessed property value in California, and a much
higher fraction of the real value because it is so egregiously
underassessed. ...
Land Rent in a Tax-free SocietyA high fraction of California real estate is absentee owned. The Sultan of Brunei, for example, owns several houses and sites in Beverly Hills and Bel Air. California's official Legislative Analyst, the highly respected William Hamm, estimated in 1978 that over fifty per cent of the value of taxable property in California was absentee-owned. ... Some half of any reduction in California property taxes leaks to out-of-state owners. Nor is this the only leakage. ... Yet no one has seized on this obvious case to show that local property taxes, substituted for absentee rent payments, creates multiple increases in local income. The whole intellectual apparatus is dominated by absentee investors and used for their benefit. Many valuable land resources are held by license, rather than title, and escape the property tax almost entirely. ... Read the whole article Outline of remarks by Mason Gaffney, for use at Moscow Congress, 5/21/96 1.
Rents are a taxable surplus. I estimate that this
taxable surplus constitutes 35% or more of the national income in
most nations with market economies, and more in resource-rich
nations. ...
2. The value of rent is huge. Every economy produces a large excess over wages. To be sure, not all of it is surplus. Some of it goes to replace capital that wears out each year. This is not part of the net surplus, nor income to the capitalist; it is a return of capital. ... Second, some goes as a return to capital, over replacement. This is pure income. Income to capital is not a taxable surplus, but a functional incentive: it moves people to form and supply capital. This entails securing new capital (by saving, and borrowing) and conserving old capital (avoiding dissaving, and avoiding export of capital). Capital income serves another useful function: it steers capital into the most productive uses. Steering capital to its best uses has the same useful function as securing new capital, and conserving old. Using capital effectively is as beneficial as securing more capital, and ever so much cheaper. The Great Transition in Russia now is learning to allow income on capital, to secure these benefits. The trick is to do it without allowing more than is needed. The rest of the excess over wages is captured in the rent of land. It is a true taxable surplus. The amount is already huge, and will become huger yet when existing taxes are abated. The size of rent is not reported in capitalist nations, except to trivialize it. Their national accountants, dominated by landowners, neglect or conceal it artfully, to protect it from being taxed. Local governments do, however, measure and tax property by value. More than half the value of property is land. In Vancouver, B.C., 73% of the value of all property assessed for taxation is land, even though much land there is exempt from tax, and not assessed at all. In California's major cities it would be just as high if only we assessed land here as accurately as they do there.
3. Rent will become huger yet when you abate taxes
presently levied on production and exchange, because these now
depress the rent of land. That is, in a tax-free market
economy, the
benefit of abating present taxes will lodge mainly in land rents. The
taxable surplus simply shifts from one form to another. This is more than a simple shift of a fixed amount. When you substitute land revenues for existing taxes, the surplus actually grows, as if by synergy. You gain more revenue base than you lose, because existing taxes now suppress much latent production. Payroll taxes directly drive workers from taxable jobs to untaxed gains from crime. Abating those taxes will unleash suppressed economic giants, along with all the new surplus values their latent production will generate. "Monetarists" warn you that "there are no free lunches." In fact, however, good policy creates lots of "free lunches." It makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts. Imagine the benefits, alone, of turning people from destructive careers in crime to useful jobs producing goods. At the same time, the effect of socializing land revenues is to stimulate better land use - the opposite of the effect of existing taxes. Every landowner, to pay the required land charge, is pushed to steer his land to the best use (just as paying interest steers capital to its best use). Thus, the shift to rent-based revenues doubly induces new production: it releases the brake of present taxes, and replaces it with an added push to produce. This is "supply-side economic policy" in the best and truest sense. It generates yet more surplus. You may take all of rent to support government functions, without damaging private market incentives, but only sharpening them. This policy lets us achieve and
reconcile two policies that
many now believe are incompatible, viz.: free markets, and common
rights in land.
4. Some of the benefit of abating existing taxes will lodge in higher after-tax wage rates, rather than higher rents. ... 5. Many varieties of natural resources generate rents. City land is the greatest single source. For example, one city, Vancouver, contains half the value of taxable property in B.C. - a province of 934,000 sq. kilometers, or 70% larger than France.
However, many other resources
yield rents. Some of them are
also huge in value, even though some are inconspicuous. Here are a
few varieties of them:
Some of those varied resources are highly valued. For example,
Canada's System of Revenue Sharing It seems to me therefore that we
need to face up to the question
that is known in my trade as Fiscal
Federalism, that is, how is money
going to be distributed by the federal government out of its
so-called surplus, either to people or the States, or localities? ...
The reason it's so hard to sell growth policies at the local level today in the United States is very much due to the fact that the United States federal government taxes people and it gives subventions to landlords. So the landlords can get the subventions without having the people. So who needs people? That's it in a nutshell. We need to reverse that, I think, if we're going to be able to make Georgism work at the local level. ... At any rate, let's begin by looking at the similarities between the federal systems in the United States and Canada. In both countries we find something called 'vertical balancing' which means that the senior governments send money to the junior governments. We find also something called 'horizontal balancing' which means that the payments are made more to the poorer governments, those that are poorer on a per capita basis, than to richer ones. ... ... Cannan's Law. ... But the general idea is, you may think you have tenure control of land but if the municipal government can tax that land and use that money to finance public welfare services, public education and other things that are open to all comers, then you will end up with an uneconomical distribution of population. ... At the same time, in both countries you find something I will call Hammer's Law. This is not a carpenter's tool but again the name of a man, an economist in Missouri, who observed in 1935 that if you compared population to land values in the different counties of his State (in the very poor counties of the Ozarks the land was hard scrabble land of very little value, with the very rich lands in the north-western part of the State, which resembles Iowa) you found that the population density was much greater on the very poor land of the Ozarks than it was on the very rich land of the northwest. ... Now another similarity to the two countries us that the subventions that do go from the federal government to the provinces in Canada (and you find a similar thing in the United States) do not come from the richer provinces. They come instead from the general fund, the general taxpayer. There is in other words more vertical balancing than there is horizontal balancing (horizontal balancing you remember means equalization among the different jurisdictions). It's a little like what somebody said about foreign aid. 'Foreign aid is a device by which poor people in rich countries are taxed to subsidize rich people in poor countries.' We'll see that equalisation in most countries works something like that; that is, in addition to this inter-provincial equalisation, there's a tax shift involved where local sources of taxation like the property tax are being displaced by the federal income tax. I suppose Ferdinand Marcos would be a splendid example of the kind of person I was talking about in the poor country and in West Virginia you have all these coal companies whose owners live in Palm Beach, whose shareholders live in Palm Beach and such places, who benefit from an inter-state equalisation that benefits West Virginia. Well these are similarities. ... The federal aid in Canada goes to provinces, whereas in the United States it goes to specific cities, The U.S. Congressman likes to have his fingerprint, as they say, on every dollar that goes from Washington. ... So in the States the idea has been: Tax the States according to their population and then give the money back according to political power. In the United States Senate it means that the smallest State has just as much clout as the biggest State or would have if their senators weren't so merchantable. (I mean, in California when we need something we just look to Nevada or one of those places for a Senator who is having difficulty raising funds for his next election. But that's another story.) ... But the most delightful distinction about Canadians is the strong and explicit recognition among almost everyone, even if he's an economist, who discusses this subject, that different resource endowments are the basis of inter-provincial differences. Equalisation in Canadian politics means sharing the economic rent. Everybody talks that way. Canadian economists even when they come to the States talk that way. Just as though rent were a permissible word in polite discourse. It's very refreshing. However there's a very selective attitude towards rent -- towards what rents are shareable, I should say.
But now how about the rents that
are generated by the valuable
lands of Montreal, or Toronto, or some of those other big and
powerful cities in the east? They are not fair
game. As a matter of fact, if you pore through the fine print
of the equalization law, which I did on the airplane, you find the
most interesting exception to what's included in the formula. I'll
explain the formula to you in a moment if you are still awake. ... Now let's look at the sharing
formula. The sharing formula in
Canada is essentially based on population and potential tax base.
And it can be made to look very complicated but I think I've boiled
it down to its essence. You take a province's percentage of the
population of Canada, and then you take the percentage of the tax
base that it has, subtract that and that gives you another
percentage. And then you multiply that times the total tax revenue
that's collected throughout Canada from that tax source, and then you
pay them that amount out of the provincial treasury. ...
The conclusion of all this is that the Canadian system is really better in terms of its Georgist implications because the payments to the provinces, with all the faults that I've described, are essentially based on population. Population is in the formula. And if you compare this with the way things are done in the States, population plays a very minor role in the formula for equalisation payments in the United States. Now, how should it be done?
Well, there's a well known Georgist
economist who figured this out a long time ago and wrote an article
about it. His name is Colin Clark. ... He came up with a plan for
collecting economic rent at the federal level, and he said what we
really should do, and this I think is the ultimate equalisation
payment, is we should classify local jurisdictions according to
land value per capita, and those that have the least land value per
capita, we'll leave all of that land value for them to use for local
purposes. But then we will graduate the federal land tax according to
the amount of land value per capita in the jurisdiction, and thus we
will have a federal tax that automatically achieves inter-regional
equity, without all this razzmatazz that I've been describing about
inter-regional equalisation payments. Read the
whole article
Economics in Support of Environmentalism
The hardest
choices are those regarding land use, because there is just so much.
We can build more houses, cars, and boats, write more music and
drama, spawn and educate more people, but we cannot make another
Hudson Valley. ... economics
shows how the market sorts and
arranges land uses, giving us a corn belt, a wheat belt, and a cotton
belt. Economists pride themselves on this achievement. (Some
preen
themselves too much, as we will see, and pride goeth before a
fall.)
Sometimes the rich take land from the poor, provoking sympathy, strong rhetoric, and occasionally effective rear-guard resistance to such changes. Actually, a well-oiled market is often quite democratic. People of moderate income, by crowding, can outcompete those of high income for the same land ... Other worthy goals that conflict are open space and water conservation. ... Something has to give. Thus far it has been wetlands that gave. Once, perhaps, we had too much wetland, but that was long ago. We cannot accommodate all those uses, and save wetlands too, just by having restaurants stop serving water, or putting bricks in toilet tanks. Those are just token or "Goo-Goo" measures for parlor reformers; they distract us from real problems, and substitute for real solutions. What is the highest and best use of water? Wetlands, maybe; more golf courses, maybe not. But we need a rule to gauge "highest and best use." Is it the market? Read on. Some of the losers in the market game are not willing to grin and bear it. Instead, they write new rules; they want to play a different game. Soilsmen did this long since. They like to classify land and rank it by its potentiality for growing crops. Farming is - to them - the ultimate value, so it is the highest and best use: cities may have what's left over. It is perhaps poetic justice that habitat-savers are now doing the same thing to farmers. They conceive highest use as that which saves endangered species: soils and farming may be damned, right along with housing, commerce, transportation, industry, storage, water supply, waste disposal, fire control, education, religion, mining, government, national defense, recreation, and whatever else needs land. All human activities, and survival itself, need land, so that list is a long one. Each constituent of the other uses becomes an enemy. Both Soilsmen and
habitatspersons have a point, we will see, but
they have a fatal weakness. Neither has a system that composes
conflict with other worthy goals, including each others'. As to
cities, both soilsmen and habitat-savers would direct cities away
from low-cost, high-productivity land to the high-cost leftover
lands. They would not make this an end in itself, of course, but it
is the necessary by-product of downgrading urban usage in the
competition for land.
Thus, to
restore citriculture and habitat in what is now L.A. we
would move the city folks to hazard-prone floodplains, steep slopes
subject to fire and erosion, quake-prone fault lines and liquefiable
soils, etc. We would also move them away from the center, imposing
longer commutes, greater auto-dependency, longer utility lines,
longer hauls to dispose of solid wastes, more air to protect, more
aquifer surface to protect, more land to protect from flooding,
etc. ... There is another kind of fundamentalist, the private property kind. The economics profession (my tribe) has, in recent years, largely abdicated its proper role as an arbitrator and gone over mainly to the side of private-property extremism. This is the essential meaning of "Neo-classical Economics," which is the idiom of most discourse in the field today, both in business and in the profession. How did economics get so twisted? Don't blame Adam Smith, or David Ricardo, or John Stuart Mill, or John E. Cairnes, or Knut Wicksell, or Philip Wicksteed, sterling 19th Century writers. Rather, blame J.B. Clark, Karl Marx, Richard T. Ely, Alvin Johnson, Frank Fetter, Frank Knight, George Stigler, and a host of lesser figures who gradually warped economics into its present form. How did they do it? They wiped out land, resources,
nature, and the environment as a
separate class for analysis. In official Neo-classical doctrine, the
world is an infinite reservoir of raw land and resources. Raw land
has no value until man does two things:
In a proper view of things, I
submit, private property is a means
to an end. It is not an end in itself; it needs a functional
rationale. The end is to get land put to the best use. All the
private land in the world was originally granted by some sovereign
public person or body, mainly for that purpose, not as a welfare
entitlement. Landowners and their lawyers have slyly, over time,
turned the means into an end, a fetish they endow with "sanctity."
This is a term they borrowed from absolutist medieval theology.
"Sanctity" means the quality or state of being holy or sacred, hence
inviolable. It means property may not be challenged, or even
questioned. It has become an end in itself, its own voucher. You're
not even supposed to think about it, it is above thought. Taboo!
Neoclassical economics, historically, marked the final, total surrender of the profession to this fetish. The modern economist's view runs something like this: "I pledge allegiance to the 14th Amendment, and to the overinterpretation of private landowner supremacy for which it has come to stand." It is ironic to recall that Radical Republicans passed that Amendment, at a time when a "Radical Republican" was one who favored freeing the slaves. The 14th Amendment was designed to protect the rights of freedmen. As interpreted now, the 14th Amendment means that The Emancipation Proclamation itself was unconstitutional! Fortunately, no one has brought that case - yet. The Neo-classical economists' view of their proper role is rather like that in The Realtor's Oath, which includes a vow "To protect the individual right of real estate ownership." The word "individual" is construed broadly to include corporations, estates, trusts, anonymous offshore funds, schools, government agencies, institutions, partnerships, cooperatives, the Duke of Westminster, the Sultan of Brunei, the Medellin Cartel, Saddam Hussein, congregations, Archbishops, families (including criminal families) and so on, but "individual" sounds more all-American and subsumes them all. This is a potent chant that stirs people to extremes of self-righteousness and siege mentality when challenged. The resemblance between Neo-classical economics and the Realtor's Oath is easier to understand when you learn that Professor Richard T. Ely, founder of the modern discipline of Land Economics, was heavily subsidized by the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the utilities, the major landowning railroads, and others of like mind and property interests. When it comes to violating property rights, air pollution today is perhaps the greatest invader and confiscator of property. Where do economists stand? Once a few of them tried to say, following A.C. Pigou, "let the polluter pay," and in parts of Europe they still do. In our modern backward thinking here at home, however, it's not the polluter who is invading the property of others, nor the human rights of those not owning property. Rather, when you tell them to stop, the government is invading their rights. The wage-earning taxpayers must pay them to stop, else you are violating both the 14th Amendment and the "Coase Theorem," a rationalization for polluting now dearly beloved by Neo-classical economists. Leapfrogging
is when developers jump over the next eligible
lands for urban expansion, and build farther out, here and there. ...
We have met the enemy, and it is US (Urban Sprawl). Let's analyze this beast, US. ... Urban sprawl, which creates a
psychological effect of great
crowding, is not the product of development as such, but of
leapfrogging. Leapfrogging means
chaos, with development in the wrong
places and times. Infilling, on the other hand, is anti-sprawl. It is
the cure for sprawl. A
common belief is that the search of open space is the main force
behind sprawl. You may test that by observing high density,
cookie-cutter subdivisions scattered throughout the land. Within each
such development, you are living at urban densities. It is when you
get onto the freeway to commute, or shop, or take the kids to school
or the dentist, or worship, that you experience open space. You
experience it as a negative resource, an obstacle between where you
are and where you want to go.
A favorite fallacy is that sprawl results from free individual choice. In fact, sprawl results mainly from subsidies to sprawl, enforced through taxation and/or utility rate regulation. Thus it is imposed, not freely chosen. The classic case, which exemplifies the whole genus, is postal service. It costs you 29¢ to send a letter across the street downtown, or from rural Idaho to rural Florida. The generic name for such subsidies to sprawl is "postage-stamp pricing" (a species of spatial cross-subsidy), which gives you the idea. ... In British Columbia, people move around a good deal by car-ferry, because of the terrain. The Provincial Government ("The Crown Provincial") runs the system. There are many lovely little islands in the Straits of Georgia, between Vancouver Island and the mainland, favored by the wealthy, the exclusive and reclusive. Being more sybaritic than Henry D. Thoreau, and politically puissant, they have demanded and received car-ferry service. This service costs about $10 for every $1 in revenue. The resulting deficit is covered by raising rates on the main plebeian line, Victoria-Vancouver. Naturally, these cheap ferries attract new visitors to the islands, and new demand for land there. Here
is how we get urban sprawl with leapfrogging. Remember the
last time you moved and went househunting? You saw some mouthwatering
homes, but they were not for sale. You had to find motivated sellers,
and pick from what they offered. It's the same with builders.
They
scour the exurbs seeking
motivated sellers. Ideally the most
motivated sellers would line up by distance from the existing city,
but the market is not ideal. Each seller is moved by his personal
circumstances, not the geographical location.
Potential builders are little concerned with the social costs they might impose, so long as others are to bear them. Thus, they sometimes settle for and build
Those are the carrots. A good
stick is also needed. We have seen
how leapfrogging results from the scattered locations of motivated
sellers. We
can motivate sellers near-in, and in compact increments
as we expand spatially, by raising land taxes there. Proposition
13
makes this difficult, but not impossible: many special assessments
have the essential motivating quality of land taxes, with a different
legal form, that exempts them from Proposition 13.
I could wax rhapsodic about the
results to expect from such
taxation, but have done so elsewhere and will leave it with a word:
visit Sydney, Adelaide, Brisbane, Copenhagen, or Johannesburg, which
have made use of this principle to excellent effect. These are basic issues, and call
for bold actions. Do not waste
your time on wimpish meliorism, or "Goo-goo" thinking. For
example:
It is said we need a land use inventory. We already have lots of them: people have been classifying land for decades. The question is, what shall we do with them? Rather, let us study how to
emulate the model of Butchart Gardens,
near Victoria, B.C. Butchart doesn't sound like a gardener's name,
and sure enough, Mr. Butchart was a hardrock miner who attacked the
earth and left a great ugly gash in it. Ah, but Mrs. Butchart, she
wanted space for a garden, so she made one there. She rediscovered
the truth that land is not just the matter that occupies space, it is
space, always renewable and reclaimable. Now Butchart Gardens is one
of the world's great beauty spots, drawing visitors from everywhere -
in the summertime you hear every language there. Our decayed central
cities, too, may bloom again like Mrs. Butchart's garden. Let us make
it our model. read the whole article Eighteen Fallacies [this has the first 7; until I get the other 11, it hasn't been cross-reffed into the themes pages.] 1. "Water rights
are real property" ... The evidence is, you do not find water
licenses recorded like
title deeds to real property. More important, you do not find them on
the real estate tax rolls. Never have I heard a licensee demand to be
taxed because he holds real property. ...
2. "Real Property is Sacred and Untouchable" Wrong! Suppose this layman writer and the Oregon Chief Justice were in error, and water permits were real property. That is out of the frying pan, into the fire. What does 'real' mean, applied to property or estate? It is not the opposite of 'imaginary.' No, 'real' is an elided English form of the French 'regal' taken into English when English kings spoke their native French. Real property is The King's. We threw out kings in 1783, but not the royal powers. Rather, we transferred those powers to our State governments. By succession, real property means government property! Every landowner is a tenant of the king or his successors in interest. The very word 'own' comes from 'owe.' An owner is one who owes. What he owed historically was fealty to his sovereign. That used to mean bending the knee, kissing the royal foot, swearing allegiance, and showing up on demand to smite the enemy. It has evolved into servitudes like eminent domain, police power, the public trust doctrine, and something else that our lawyers may have glided over, but economists underline: the tax power. These concepts are basic to common
law which has been brought into
every U.S. state constitution (save Louisiana's). Moses was not just
whistling Dixie when he quoted The Lord as saying "The land shall not
be sold forever; for the land is mine, and ye are strangers and
sojourners with me." ... 3. "You cannot
take real property without compensation" Wrong! Whoever said
that has not been following zoning law. As a
rule of thumb, zoning can take away about 85% of the use value of
land before it is declared an unconstitutional 'taking' of property.
The owner must be left with some 'economically viable' use, meaning almost any use whose revenues exceed expenses, however small the net gain. As to other property, well! No one has yet been compensated for losing the fruits of his sweated brow to the IRS, at rates which once soared as high as 90% in the top bracket. 4. "If property
falls, America falls" Wrong, at least in my opinion. Property is
not an end in itself;
it is a means of getting resources put to their best use for the
general good.
5. "The cost of water is passed through to consumers in higher prices" Wrong! At last I'm in my own field. Prices are determined by supply and demand, not cost. If you sell in a national or world market, or even a competitive local market, you are a price-taker, not a price-maker. You can't pass cost hikes on to consumers; you have to eat them. ... With dearer water you use less by controlling it better, switching from primitive furrow irrigation to sprinklers, spitters and drip. This in turn lets you do new things like growing avocados on steep hillsides formerly barren, yielding more dollars of product for less water (and in this case on waste land). The above facts point to a fascinating, portentous corollary: you can tax water withdrawals without wrecking the water economy. On the contrary, such taxes (carefully crafted to be constructive) can encourage conservation, getting more bins and bales for the bucket, so to speak. Americans are raised on anti-tax slogans masquerading as economic analysis, always presuming taxes destroy good incentives and wreck the economy. Here is a kind of tax
that
raises revenue while strengthening the
economy. ...
6. "You can't stop a landowner from pumping on his own land" Wrong! You can even control his hunting and fishing there, and apply police power. As to pumping, it depends on whether he owns what is under his land. If it is oil, we all know mineral
rights are routinely severed
from surface rights by sale, reservation or lease. Water can be
subject to constraints, too. ... A simple solution to half our tractable water problems would be a severance tax on water withdrawals. If you can regulate it you can tax it. A tax can be viewed as nothing
more than an economic price
charged by the owner of water (the state) for using its property. ... 7. "Economics is hostile to environmentalism" Partly wrong, although some economists are guilty as charged. Economics, properly pursued, deals with how best to meet human wants. Recreation, fishing, wildlife, amenities, clean air, pure water, sustained resource supply, watershed protection, good health, and conservation are legitimate human wants. Many economists, I confess and deplore, are blind to such values, and think only of maximizing GNP measured in the brutal old-fashioned way, developed during World War II for war's emergency purposes and never revised. Others, cowed by cow college deans, dare not think at all, and write only of sustaining farm land values: damn the cost to others. Many others, however, are
leaders in developing environmental and
resource economics. Today wise environmentalists, rather than sniping
at all economists, are allying with the last kind.
Here are four reasons why environmentalists and economists are natural allies. (a) Economizing is conserving. ... (b) Subsidy wastes both dollars and ecologies. ... (c) Correct economic analysis prescribes more water for fish ... (d) Correct economic analysis presumes public trusts ... You would be amazed to hear anyone say 'I will pay any price,' There are many documented instances of a person swearing under oath his land is worth no more than $X for tax assessment purpose and soon thereafter swearing again it is worth $15X when being condemned for a park or other public use, because he wouldn't sell it for less. For Want of a Landlord Henry George 100 Years Later: The Great Reconciler Henry George (1839-1897) is best
known today for Progress
and Poverty (1879). Eloquent, timely and challenging, this
book soon became and remains the all-time best-seller on economic
theory and policy.
In 1879, George electrified the world by identifying one underlying cause for two great economic plagues:
These twin plagues arose from concentrated ownership of land, compounded by land speculation. Large landowners and speculators (often one and the same) held the best land idle or underused, forcing labor onto marginal land and driving down wages. Collapse of speculative land price bubbles caused periodic slumps. (By "land" George meant exclusive rights to use natural resources in a specified territory. It included mining, water, fishing, and timber rights, road and rail rights-of way, and some patents. George emphasized the high value and productivity of urban land, which facilitated communication and trade. Today, we would add to "land" such items as taxi medallions, telecommunications licenses and pollution "rights".) George followed his analysis with a plausible, practicable remedy: eliminate all taxes except for a tax on land values. The "single tax," as it later became known, would invigorate the economy by breaking up large idle holdings, making land available to those who would use it. And it would suck the air out of speculative bubbles, damping the boom and bust cycle.
George toured the world as an
immensely popular political
activist, orator and folk hero. He died suddenly in 1897, while
running a second time for Mayor of New York City. A hundred thousand
mourners marched at his funeral.
In the US, "Georgism" melded into
the populist movement, and later
into the Progressive Movement. At the national level, the Progressive
Movement dominated both major political parties for 17 years,
1902-19. At the local level, its influence continued through the
early 1920s. Local property taxation was modified along Georgist
lines: land assessments were raised relative to improvements and
rates were increased substantially. California water districts
financed by land taxes catapulted California to the top-producing
farm state in the Union, using land that had been desert or range.
California generated farm jobs and homes, while other states
destroyed them by allowing well-connected speculators and "robber
barons" to grab large tracts of land. A Georgist, Congressman Warren
Worth Bailey of Pennsylvania, drafted the first Federal personal
income tax law on Georgist lines: falling mainly on very high incomes
from property. ... Neo-classical
economists give us only a hard choice: we may have
equity, or efficiency, but not both. By contrast, George's program
reconciles equity and efficiency. Think of it! George takes two polar
philosophies, collectivism and individualism, and composes them into
one solution. He cuts the Gordian knot. Like Keynes after him, George
inspires us by saying, "Forget the bitter tradeoffs; we can have it
all!" Read the whole article George's Economics of Abundance: Replacing dismal choices with practical resolutions and synergies Introduction:
Resolutions vs. trade-offs
1. Equity, Efficiency, and Incentives a. Equity and
efficiency
b. Reconciling progressivity and motivation. 2. Reconciling
demand side and supply side economics
a. Aggregate. Consumption and
production
b. Investing and Saving 3. Micro
"structural" reform coupled with macro reform
4. Local, state, and national applications 5. Relieving labor without burdening capital 6. Urban renewal without subsidizing evictions 7. Contains urban sprawl, improves urban linkages among complementary land uses, without overriding market choices. a. Taxing land sharpens market incentives via the leverage effect noted earlier. b. Fosters resident ownership, civic participation 8. Reconciles common rights to land with private tenure 9. Paying the debt while also making jobs 10. Making labor cheaper to hire without lowering wage rates 11. Adding people and capital w/o diluting resource base 12. Fostering economy in government in the very process of raising revenue 13. Enhance evironment and conserve resources while making jobs Summary A summary of reconciliations
1. Couples equity with efficiency.
2. Couples progressivity with motivation. Abates concentration of wealth and power while widening the scope of productive ambition and enterprise. 3. Makes more jobs without inflation. Raises demand-side and supply-side together, "leveling them upwards." 4. Raises both inducement to invest and inducement to save, at any income level. Also raises saving by raising income level. 5. Couples structural reform and macro reform. 6. May be applied at local, state, and national levels, together or jointly, in small degrees or large. 7. Relieves labor of taxation without burdening capital, and vice versa. 8. Renews cities without subsidizing evictions. 9. Contains urban sprawl, infills and coordinates cities without superimposing planning on the market. 10. Fosters resident ownership and civic participation without laws against absentee ownership, or other use of compulsion, but in the very process of lubricating land markets. 11. Asserts common rights to land while strengthening private tenure. Permits of privatizing without giveaway. 12. Allows paying off public debts while fostering full employment through (true) fiscal stimulus. 13. Makes labor cheaper to hire while raising real wage rates (take-home pay, disposable income). Thus makes jobs without lowering wage rates or "making work." 14. Lets regions, nations, and the world add population and capital without diluting their resource bases. 15. Fosters economy in government in the process of raising revenue. 16. Saves the environment in the process of intensifying land use. 17. Smoothes business cycles without depending solely on contra-cyclical fiscal or monetary policy. Stabilizes and secures financial institutions with only minimal regulation. 18. Effects land reform and redistribution abroad and at home, urban as well as rural, without government expense, and without acreage limitations, working through free markets. 19. Equalizes credit ratings for land buyers without any controls over lenders. Epilogue: how the
public demonstrates its preference for resolutions over dismal
choices
It is part of George's genius that his proposals solve one problem by resolving it with another, turning two problems into one solution. It is something like tuning up the orchestra for a concert, turning dissonance into harmony, and keeping the beat together, turning cacaphony into rhythm. It is the mark of good solutions that they reconcile and resolve, rather than simply "trade-off." [If you ever immerse yourself in mathematics deeply enough to find |